I don't remember the US and UK being so successful in Afghanistan nor Iraq judging by what we are witnessing today.
Western societies have no idea what we are dealing with. A psychopathic nihilistic cult of death who have no problem sacrificing their own men, women and children for the cause of Allah. Each one of these terrorists are more than happy to meet their Shahada with 72 virgins up next to their "spiritual" leader. MHMD.
"Israel should switch to a hearts-and-minds campaign." The US has tried from Vietnam foward and, in my opinion, it has been a dismal failure. Either you remove the fighting class or the people won't change their minds about supporting them and then you work hearts and minds but not before the fighters are gone. In Gaza the Gazaniacs will support Hamas and if that group is gone then there might be a chance to persuade the people but the terrorist organization has to go first. However, the real problem in the region is Islam.
The "hearts and minds" approach of American generals hasn't work out so well in Iraq and Afghanistan either, because in both places the American forces are up against Islamic jihadis who believe they are defending Dar al-Islam against infidels, and they have support of the people, who believe the same. The hearts and minds idea does not take into account the degree to which a Muslim population will support Islamic jihad, either out of fear or fanaticism.
It is correct to believe that withdrawing that popular support would starve the terrorists of the moral and logistical support they need to continue, but the reality is that support for Hamas among Muslim Palestinians has not waned (note that I only use their term for themselves for the sake of expediency, not to endorse their delusions). Recent polls indicate that a majority of them still view Oct 7th as justified and would prefer Hamas leadership to secular rival Fatah. If some of them say they opt for a two-state solution, they really view it as a temporary truce, giving them time to re-build Hamas. This is an example of taqiyya, religiously sanctioned deception. Their long-term ideological goal of destroying Israel has not gone away.
I looked up the COIN strategy. It is based in part on experiences in Vietnam, where it did not work either. However, the principle is sound: win over the populace to win the war against militant insurgents who rely on the local populace for support. Its execution is the hard part, especially when it comes to Communism or Islamism, the two main ideological enemies of the Western world. For this reason, I believe the 20-point Trump plan is likely doomed because it relies on disarming and re-educating them, which at present they are not amenable to. The Chinese state did it Xinjiang province with millions of Muslim Uyghur but the CCP's methods have been condemned internationally. The other option, mass deportation -- for example, to Somaliland -- has also been condemned but in the end it might be the only way.
A noted scholar of religion, Marc Juergensmeyer, argues that secularization is the key to peace. Yes, but how can that be accomplished, especially when it seems that half the world is giving support to the terrorists and is scapegoating Israel? Almost the entire Muslim world, and now millions of delusional Leftists give moral support to Hamas. As has often been stated, Israel may win militarily but has lost on the public relations front.
To explore this further, I was recently comparing the ideas of Robert Spencer, a well known critic of Islam and founder of JihadWatch, with sociologist of religious violence, Marc Juergensmeyer, author of the book Terror in the Mind of God. I think this comparison sheds light on this discussion, so bear with me.
Juergensmeyer's thought lines up more with the 'hearts and minds' campaign referred to above. He argues for secularization and to end cyclic violence that results in retaliation. Spencer is critical of "cycle of violence" theories—like those of Juergensmeyer's—arguing that it doesn't properly apply to Islam. While Juergensmeyer views Islamic violence as a sociological process that can be interrupted, Spencer views it as a theological mandate independent of external provocation. Spencer argues that modern social science "misdiagnoses" the problem of Islamic violence by looking for "root causes" like poverty, state oppression, or historical grievances. Jihad, he says, is proactive, not reactive. Grievances cited by groups like Hamas or Al-Qaeda are merely "pretexts" used to make their cause more palatable to Westerners. Even if Israel or the U.S. were perfectly conciliatory, the Islamic imperative would remain, meaning the violence would not cease. It would simply lose its current excuse. So offering a two-state solution is not going to work. It's well beyond that now.
Juergensmeyer is correct to argue that religious terrorism is seen by its adherents as a "cosmic war" of good versus evil and the jihadi sees himself as an agent of the divine, giving his life and death ultimate meaning. But this only illustrates the power of jihad and why it's almost impossible to stop it, short of killing the jihadi. He is not easily secularized. The only solution is cutting off his support, which is not easy when almost the entire Muslim world is supportive. I don't mean Arab government leaders who signed the Abraham accords and live in fear of jihad themselves and want to supress it; I mean the average Muslim. Most are anti-Israel, having been brought up that way. And there are a lot of them: two billion.
Jurgensmeyer and others like him argue that continued force by the state only reinforces the terrorist's position. His solution to the 'cosmic war' is to de-sanctify the conflict, moving it from the "cosmic" realm back to the "political" realm where rational, negotiable compromises are possible. In other words, the solution is secularization. But the problem is that this is not a secular conflict in the mind of the jihadi. Spencer points out that the Quran is seen by its adherents as immutable and divine. Juergensmeyer sees religious framing as a choice made by actors, but Spencer sees it as a requirement of Islamic faith. Nor does Spencer view violent jihad as just one interpretation of Islam; he thinks it is central to that faith.
A further problem that Spencer raises is that because there is no central authority in Sunni Islam to "de-sanctify" a war. Any jihadi can always point back to the literal text to restart the violence, rendering any "peace treaty" temporary. Secularization is viewed by the "pious" jihadi as apostasy. Secularization of some part of the population merely endangers the Muslim apostate, including those in a secular government. The problem with appeasement is that it is based on Western projection: because Western religions underwent an Enlightenment and secularization, Islam, it is thought, can and will do the same. But all Muslim reformation attempts have been violently quashed. Spencer says, "the jihadists will not be bought off by negotiations or concessions. This is the revival of a 1,400-year-old war . . . it will not end anytime soon."
The idea that peace is possible through secularization is a dangerous delusion because it ignores the "supremacist" nature of the religious ideology in question. I believe Spencer's analysis is more or less consistent with the above essay argues. The conclusion from this is not hopeful because it means the war will go on, unless perhaps there are mass deportations sufficient to remove local popular support for the terrorists. The other strategy, which seems to be the one pursued for the time being, is to build a technocratic surveillance state in Gaza against terrorism, even though it can never be entirely secure against terrorism as long as Palestinians live there.
There is only one tactic for dealing with Hamas in Gaza...
Kill every member of the Terrorist organization Hamas...
That's not murder...
It is Justice!
Oct 7th will never be over till every person that participated or supported it is dead!
Jews and Christians together...
We are Strong, We are Brave!
We are... Sword of God!
I don't remember the US and UK being so successful in Afghanistan nor Iraq judging by what we are witnessing today.
Western societies have no idea what we are dealing with. A psychopathic nihilistic cult of death who have no problem sacrificing their own men, women and children for the cause of Allah. Each one of these terrorists are more than happy to meet their Shahada with 72 virgins up next to their "spiritual" leader. MHMD.
"Israel should switch to a hearts-and-minds campaign." The US has tried from Vietnam foward and, in my opinion, it has been a dismal failure. Either you remove the fighting class or the people won't change their minds about supporting them and then you work hearts and minds but not before the fighters are gone. In Gaza the Gazaniacs will support Hamas and if that group is gone then there might be a chance to persuade the people but the terrorist organization has to go first. However, the real problem in the region is Islam.
The "hearts and minds" approach of American generals hasn't work out so well in Iraq and Afghanistan either, because in both places the American forces are up against Islamic jihadis who believe they are defending Dar al-Islam against infidels, and they have support of the people, who believe the same. The hearts and minds idea does not take into account the degree to which a Muslim population will support Islamic jihad, either out of fear or fanaticism.
It is correct to believe that withdrawing that popular support would starve the terrorists of the moral and logistical support they need to continue, but the reality is that support for Hamas among Muslim Palestinians has not waned (note that I only use their term for themselves for the sake of expediency, not to endorse their delusions). Recent polls indicate that a majority of them still view Oct 7th as justified and would prefer Hamas leadership to secular rival Fatah. If some of them say they opt for a two-state solution, they really view it as a temporary truce, giving them time to re-build Hamas. This is an example of taqiyya, religiously sanctioned deception. Their long-term ideological goal of destroying Israel has not gone away.
I looked up the COIN strategy. It is based in part on experiences in Vietnam, where it did not work either. However, the principle is sound: win over the populace to win the war against militant insurgents who rely on the local populace for support. Its execution is the hard part, especially when it comes to Communism or Islamism, the two main ideological enemies of the Western world. For this reason, I believe the 20-point Trump plan is likely doomed because it relies on disarming and re-educating them, which at present they are not amenable to. The Chinese state did it Xinjiang province with millions of Muslim Uyghur but the CCP's methods have been condemned internationally. The other option, mass deportation -- for example, to Somaliland -- has also been condemned but in the end it might be the only way.
A noted scholar of religion, Marc Juergensmeyer, argues that secularization is the key to peace. Yes, but how can that be accomplished, especially when it seems that half the world is giving support to the terrorists and is scapegoating Israel? Almost the entire Muslim world, and now millions of delusional Leftists give moral support to Hamas. As has often been stated, Israel may win militarily but has lost on the public relations front.
To explore this further, I was recently comparing the ideas of Robert Spencer, a well known critic of Islam and founder of JihadWatch, with sociologist of religious violence, Marc Juergensmeyer, author of the book Terror in the Mind of God. I think this comparison sheds light on this discussion, so bear with me.
Juergensmeyer's thought lines up more with the 'hearts and minds' campaign referred to above. He argues for secularization and to end cyclic violence that results in retaliation. Spencer is critical of "cycle of violence" theories—like those of Juergensmeyer's—arguing that it doesn't properly apply to Islam. While Juergensmeyer views Islamic violence as a sociological process that can be interrupted, Spencer views it as a theological mandate independent of external provocation. Spencer argues that modern social science "misdiagnoses" the problem of Islamic violence by looking for "root causes" like poverty, state oppression, or historical grievances. Jihad, he says, is proactive, not reactive. Grievances cited by groups like Hamas or Al-Qaeda are merely "pretexts" used to make their cause more palatable to Westerners. Even if Israel or the U.S. were perfectly conciliatory, the Islamic imperative would remain, meaning the violence would not cease. It would simply lose its current excuse. So offering a two-state solution is not going to work. It's well beyond that now.
Juergensmeyer is correct to argue that religious terrorism is seen by its adherents as a "cosmic war" of good versus evil and the jihadi sees himself as an agent of the divine, giving his life and death ultimate meaning. But this only illustrates the power of jihad and why it's almost impossible to stop it, short of killing the jihadi. He is not easily secularized. The only solution is cutting off his support, which is not easy when almost the entire Muslim world is supportive. I don't mean Arab government leaders who signed the Abraham accords and live in fear of jihad themselves and want to supress it; I mean the average Muslim. Most are anti-Israel, having been brought up that way. And there are a lot of them: two billion.
Jurgensmeyer and others like him argue that continued force by the state only reinforces the terrorist's position. His solution to the 'cosmic war' is to de-sanctify the conflict, moving it from the "cosmic" realm back to the "political" realm where rational, negotiable compromises are possible. In other words, the solution is secularization. But the problem is that this is not a secular conflict in the mind of the jihadi. Spencer points out that the Quran is seen by its adherents as immutable and divine. Juergensmeyer sees religious framing as a choice made by actors, but Spencer sees it as a requirement of Islamic faith. Nor does Spencer view violent jihad as just one interpretation of Islam; he thinks it is central to that faith.
A further problem that Spencer raises is that because there is no central authority in Sunni Islam to "de-sanctify" a war. Any jihadi can always point back to the literal text to restart the violence, rendering any "peace treaty" temporary. Secularization is viewed by the "pious" jihadi as apostasy. Secularization of some part of the population merely endangers the Muslim apostate, including those in a secular government. The problem with appeasement is that it is based on Western projection: because Western religions underwent an Enlightenment and secularization, Islam, it is thought, can and will do the same. But all Muslim reformation attempts have been violently quashed. Spencer says, "the jihadists will not be bought off by negotiations or concessions. This is the revival of a 1,400-year-old war . . . it will not end anytime soon."
The idea that peace is possible through secularization is a dangerous delusion because it ignores the "supremacist" nature of the religious ideology in question. I believe Spencer's analysis is more or less consistent with the above essay argues. The conclusion from this is not hopeful because it means the war will go on, unless perhaps there are mass deportations sufficient to remove local popular support for the terrorists. The other strategy, which seems to be the one pursued for the time being, is to build a technocratic surveillance state in Gaza against terrorism, even though it can never be entirely secure against terrorism as long as Palestinians live there.
Excellent essay, well thought out and sensible.