The IDF chief quit. The timing is not coincidental.

Why now? What does Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi know that the ordinary public currently does not?

IDF chief Herzi Halevi speaks at an IDF cadets graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 base in southern Israel in 2023. (photo: Israel Defense Forces)

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On Tuesday, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), announced his resignation, effective March 6, 2025 — when Stage 1 of the ceasefire with Hamas is set to conclude.

His decision stems from the IDF’s inability to prevent the devastating Hamas-led massacre and kidnappings on October 7, 2023, which resulted in approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths and the abduction of some 250 more people.

Appointed as the IDF Chief of Staff in January 2023, Halevi was the first religious recruit and the first settler from Judea and Samaria (also known as the West Bank) to lead the Israeli military. In his resignation letter, Halevi accepted full responsibility for the military’s shortcomings during the October 7th attack.

Throughout his tenure, especially following October 7th, Halevi faced mounting criticism from various political factions.

Far-Right leaders in the current government’s coalition, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, accused him of lacking a decisive strategy against Hamas and called for more aggressive military actions. They have contended that Halevi’s approach was insufficient to ensure Israel’s security and demanded a more robust response to Hamas, including reoccupying the Gaza Strip.

Halevi’s resignation is part of a broader trend of accountability within the IDF's senior leadership. Prior to his announcement, other high-ranking officials, such as Major General Aharon Haliva, head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, and Major General Yaron Finkelman, commander of the Southern Command, also resigned, acknowledging their roles in the failures leading up to and during the October 7th attacks.

The resignation comes at a critical juncture as Israel is engaged in hostage-for-ceasefire negotiations with Hamas. Halevi indicated that stepping down at this moment would allow for a smooth transition in military leadership, ensuring that the IDF remains prepared to address ongoing security challenges.

He emphasized that his decision was made “long ago” and that now, with the IDF “holding the upper hand in all theaters of combat and with another hostage return agreement underway,” in addition to having “altered the Middle East” across seven different fronts, “the time has come” for his departure.

But why now? What does Halevi know that the ordinary public currently does not?

The way I see it, there are two primary options. The first is that the war as we know it is over, that Stage 1 of the current hostage-for-ceasefire deal will lead to the second and third stages and, ultimately, to at least some semblance of a permanent ceasefire (until Hamas and/or other Palestinian terrorist organizations break it again down the road).

The second option is that, as U.S. President Donald Trump indicated on Monday upon moving back into the White House, the chances are that the second and third stages will not come to fruition. (Trump’s words were that he is “not confident” he could keep the ceasefire in Gaza and complete the deal’s three phases.)

If the ceasefire fails for whatever reason, the IDF will find itself in an increasingly tricky situation — because Hamas as an organized military apparatus is destroyed and, for the last few months, it has been operating in guerrilla formats.

Hamas is attempting to rebuild its battalions in Gaza despite enduring significant losses and ongoing Israeli operations. Following the latest ceasefire, some Hamas operatives emerged publicly, declaring, “We are here and we will stay here,” signaling their persistence.

Leveraging the dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza, Hamas is recruiting new members, offering monthly salaries of $50 to $100, along with family aid and essentials like food and diapers. “For the Gazans, it’s like touching God’s tail,” remarked Professor Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Misgav Institute, speaking to Israel’s N12 Magazine.¹

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently acknowledged what Israel already knows: Hamas is replenishing its ranks as fast as it loses them. Data shared by journalist Yaron Avraham reveals that, despite extensive military efforts, Hamas’ recruitment rate exceeds the neutralization of its operatives.

Israel’s Knesset² Foreign Affairs and Security Committee estimates between 20,000 and 23,000 terrorists currently operate in Gaza, including organized and unorganized groups, with a smaller contingent from Palestinian Islamic Jihad and others.

Even after severe blows to its core leadership and infrastructure, Hamas retains capabilities like producing explosives. According to The Wall Street Journal, hundreds of young, inexperienced recruits have joined in recent months, with some Arab sources suggesting the figure could reach thousands. Professor Michael explained the grim reality for these new recruits: “Either they return safely from the mission, or they end their lives there.”

Hamas’ tactics have evolved into a guerrilla warfare model, similar to insurgent strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. “It is adapting to the new situation,” said Major General (reservist) Gershon Hacohen, comparing Hamas to other insurgent groups that inflicted heavy casualties on conventional armies.

Hamas also taps into ideological fervor. “The people are together with the terror,” said Hacohen. “It is a popular-national-religious organization that touches hearts.” This ideological unity contrasts sharply with Hezbollah, which struggles with internal cohesion.

The new recruits, however, lack the advanced training of Hamas’ elite Nukhba forces. “These are young guys who don’t undergo significant military training,” said Professor Michael. Instead, they are used as “cannon fodder,” driven by desperation, anger, or ideological motives.

Hamas’ recruitment drive, led by Muhammad Sinwar, further challenges Israel. The IDF faces repeated operations in areas Hamas attempts to rebuild, creating a cycle of destruction and resistance. Former Shin Bet³ official Shalom Ben Hanan explained, “Putting a Kalashnikov⁴ in someone’s hands and telling them to lie down in an abandoned building and take aim like a sniper is not too complicated.”

The issue of an alternative to Hamas’ rule remains contentious. While some propose reintroducing the Palestinian Authority or involving regional powers, Major General Hacohen is skeptical: “Even if the Palestinian Authority enters, without the IDF it has no chance, and certainly not the Saudis or the Emiratis.” He predicts that any entity which enters the Strip will end up like the Fatah⁵ members who were thrown from rooftops by Hamas operatives in 2007, perhaps in a more subtle way.

General Charles Brown, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, criticized Israel’s strategy of withdrawing from conquered areas, which allows Hamas to reestablish itself. Yet, staying in these areas makes IDF forces vulnerable, a dilemma acknowledged by Israeli officials.

Hamas has honed techniques requiring minimal training, relying on cheap civilian technology like drones and sensors. Their underground tunnel network has adapted to ambush and survival warfare. This low-tech but effective approach complicates Israel’s efforts to counter them.

The broader consequences of Hamas’ rule are catastrophic. Gaza faces near-total devastation, with an estimated $40 billion required for reconstruction. Its population, displaced and impoverished, lives under dire conditions. Despite these challenges, Hamas remains entrenched, benefiting from both fear and a perception of authority derived from controlling aid distribution.

Ultimately, while Hamas’ military power has been significantly diminished, its capacity for resilience and adaptation ensures that its threat persists, creating ongoing challenges for Israel and the region.

And yet, it is in these conditions that organizations like Hamas flourish. Indeed, Palestinian leaders dating back to the 1960s have continuously flourished when the Palestinian going gets tough (usually self-inflicted) and the Jews are a convenient scapegoat (similar to the Nazis, the ayatollahs, and other totalitarian regimes).

With no real alternative to replace Hamas in Gaza, the IDF alone cannot bring about a “total victory” in the Strip — even with its phenomenal rebound and achievements over the past 15 months. Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi knows this as well as anyone, and it is likely why he felt the time had come to submit his resignation.

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1. “.בטלים ממעש, מושפלים וזועמים": כך מגייס חמאס דור חדש של מחבלים” N12.

2. Israeli parliament

3. One of three principal organizations of the Israeli Intelligence Community, mainly focused on domestic Israel and the Palestinian Territories

4. Another name for an AK-47 assault rifle

5. The Palestinian political party that runs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank