The Liberal vs. Conservative Debate in Israel

There are "Jewish Israelis" and then there are "Israeli Jews." How each Israeli defines themselves determines how they perceive the Jewish state and its conflicts.

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I vividly remember when I was about 12 or 13 years old, at a Jewish summer camp in Northern California, they asked us during a group activity: Are you a Jewish American or an American Jew?

At the time I was perplexed by this question, since I did not see much of any difference. But as a grew older and learned to appreciate nuance, the question became rather interesting while grappling with my emerging adult identity.

Turns out, the same debate rages in Israel, not so much verbally but ultimately in how Israelis relate to Zionism, the state, and its political leaders. And when crises hit the Jewish nation, such as October 7th, this debate takes center stage — without many Israelis even realizing it.

Let me explain.

“Israeli Jews,” who prioritize their national identity as Israelis, are first and foremost citizens of Israel, a democratic country. They are also, as a secondary or even tertiary marker, Jewish (whether by religion, ethnicity, tradition, and/or culture).

By putting an emphasis on Israel as a democratic country, they often desire what is called in the West “separation between church and state.” In this way, they are more inclined to support Israel as a “state for the Jews” but not a “Jewish state.” Hence, they are more Left-leaning and place a premium on democracy and, by extension, liberalism.

For example, many “Israeli Jews” do not want Judaism influencing sociopolitical decisions, such as public transportation on the Sabbath, overly religious education in primary schools, and Jewish marriage protocols as the only legal way to get married in Israel.

I have two main criticisms of “Israeli Jews.” The first is that they relegate Judaism to a religion. Indeed, Judaism has religious components but it is not exclusively a religion, at least not in the same way that Islam and Christianity are religions. Judaism is the culture, heritage, traditions, and history of the Jewish People.

And my second criticism of “Israeli Jews” is that they tend to forget which part of the world we live in (the Middle East). Many of them wrongfully assume that the Palestinians are “just like us” and therefore want the same things as us (e.g. to make a decent living and live in peace with everyone around us).

Hence, according to this line of thinking, if we just made peace with the Palestinians and helped them found their own country, we would all live in peace and harmony. If that sounds like a Disney movie, it is because many “Israeli Jews” are “living in a movie” as we say in Hebrew, to describe someone who is totally out of touch with reality.

Then there are “Jewish Israelis” who place a greater emphasis on their religious or ethnic identity as Jews who live in Israel. This term is common in contexts where the distinction between different religious or ethnic groups within Israel is important; for example, when discussing the Jewish community in contrast to Arab Israelis or other non-Jewish citizens of Israel.

“Living in Israel is for us … the continuation of our Jewish identity,” said Israeli media personality Laly Derai. “Whereas the program presented by the Left is cosmopolitan — in which nationalism is overcome — we … do not relate at all to this discourse, in which human and civil rights come before our Jewish identity.”¹

In this way, “Jewish Israelis” are more inclined to vote for politicians whose policies include reinforcing Israel as a “Jewish state” and not just a “state for the Jews.” Many “Jewish Israelis” see the creation of the State of Israel as the realization of a millennial dream to return to the Jews’ indigenous homeland, as opposed to many “Israeli Jews” who think the state was created because of the Holocaust.

For instance, when center-Left politician Yair Lapid became prime minister in 2022, he visited Israel’s Holocaust memorial and proclaimed that Israel was created because of the Holocaust. But when the more Right-wing Benjamin Netanyahu is elected, he visits the Western Wall in Jerusalem.

“It’s a Jewish declaration that fits us,” said Derai. “The attachment to our traditions remains very strong across generations.”

Thus “Jewish Israelis” tend to be more Right-leaning, prioritize the Jewish aspects of the state over democracy and liberalism, and are relatively comfortable with Judaism influencing sociopolitical decisions.

And, for them, living in a Jewish state means doing as Jews do: keeping kosher (some more than others), honoring the Jewish holidays, marrying via Jewish protocols, and ensuring that Israel remains a Jewish state first and foremost.

My only criticism of “Jewish Israelis” is when we let Judaism and our Jewishness trample on others’ rights, freedoms, and opportunities. For example, some “Jewish Israelis” over-index on their resentment of Arabs, including Israeli Arabs, even though Israeli Arabs are an asset to the State of Israel so long as they are law-abiding citizens.

If we do not treat Israeli Arabs as an asset, they become a liability — which harms the State of Israel’s national security by effectively turning Israeli Arabs into the notorious “fifth column” (a group within a country who is sympathetic to or working for its enemies).

But where I ultimately relate more to “Jewish Israelis” is in how they perceive and deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They see it for what it is: not merely a territorial dispute but a clash of national identities, historical narratives, and religious ideologies.

The Jewish connection to the land of Israel dates back millennia, with deep religious and historical significance. For “Jewish Israelis,” Israel represents not just a homeland but a sanctuary from centuries of persecution.

What’s more, the Zionist movement (which gained momentum in the late 19th and early 20th centuries) sought to establish a Jewish state in response to increasingly catastrophic antisemitism in Europe, no less throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

So when genocidal regimes (like the Iranian tentacles named Hamas and Hezbollah) take aim at Israel (like they did on October 7th), “Jewish Israelis” see the conflict for what it is — again, not merely a territorial dispute but a clash of national identities, historical narratives, and religious ideologies.

This means that a two-state solution, at least for now, is nowhere remotely near the answer, because it is not even on the table in the hearts and minds of the majority of Palestinians (who have been brainwashed into insisting on a “right of return”) as well as the majority of Israelis (who are tired of relentless, virulent, antisemitism-driven Palestinian terrorism aimed at Israeli citizens, spanning decades, aimed at destroying the Jewish state).

On the other hand, “Israeli Jews” by and large relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via two of the three major liberal theories, the first and most important of which is democratic peace theory. It suggests that democratic countries are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies.

Thus, “Israeli Jews” want to make peace with the Palestinians (with the faulty assumption that the majority of Palestinians want to make true, lasting peace with Israel).

But a potential Palestinian state would not be a democracy, so the idea that armed conflict would be less likely with a neighboring Palestinian state is erroneous. On the contrary, it would be an even bigger launching pad for relentless, virulent, antisemitism-driven Palestinian terrorism aimed at Israel.

The second major liberal theory to which many “Israeli Jews” subscribe is economic interdependence theory, or the mutual dependence of participants in an economic system who trade in order to obtain the products they cannot or do not produce efficiently themselves.

Such trading relationships require that the behavior of a participant affects its trading partners, and it would be costly to rupture their relationship. More economic interdependence in the world, therefore, supposes more peace.

You might recall that, prior to October 7th, Israel allowed some 18,000 Palestinians from Gaza to work in Israel every day and earn substantially higher wages than they would have in the Strip, yet it turned out that many of them assisted Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in planning the October 7th attacks.

Israel also supplies the New Israeli Shekel as Gaza’s currency, since no other country on this planet would dare give the Palestinians their currency for rightful fear of devaluation, and that did not stop 3,000 Palestinians from waltzing into Israel pogrom-style on October 7th. No less that more than 50 percent of Gazans are satisfied with Hamas’ war efforts according to recent polling.²

The problem with each of these liberal theories is, while Israel has tried to engage in each of them, the Middle East and North Africa are inherently non-liberal environments. And no matter how much Israel tries to be a liberal democracy in the region, the Jewish state is a product of its own environment, like every country in every region on this planet.

Lawrence, who knew Arabia well, compared Arab societies to shifting sand that one moment speaks quietly and the next turns into a storm. They are societies that have a strong tendency towards violence; that can only exist under the rule of tyranny; and that are overly preoccupied with genius, pride, and victory. Ultimately, they are societies that in a certain sense are still characterized by the ancient mentality of ancient times.

This is where realism, the antidote to liberalism, comes into play — but even within realism, there are different streams. For instance, there are those known as “defensive realists” who believe that the structure of the international system (i.e. anarchy) fosters security competition, but it really rules out the great power of war almost all the time.

Therefore, it makes sense to care about the balance of power, and to focus on maintaining how much power a state has. Defensive realists contend that, if a state tries to gain more power, the system will punish it.

Then there are “offensive realists” who believe that states look for opportunities to gain more power, and almost every time they see an opportunity to do so — with a relatively high likelihood of success and low cost of execution — they will try to capitalize on that opportunity.

The Middle East and North Africa are comprised of states that look for opportunities to gain more power (notably Iran and Qatar) and the Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah war is a direct manifestation of “offensive realism.”

Historically, the issue between Israel and Arab states was never about the Palestinians. This is what many liberals — including many “Israeli Jews” — get wrong about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinians only seriously organized themselves in the 1960s, with the supreme help of the Soviets, who used the Palestinians as pawns to oppose Israel, a democratic state, during the Cold War.

The Arabs, too, have used the Palestinians as pawns in fear of the concept of Zionism, which is fundamentally a Western movement. It is a movement that lives on the border of the East, but always faces the West. And so it is today: Israel stands against the natural tendencies of the Middle East to penetrate the West and enslave it.

For this reason, the Arabs see Israel as a foreign creature in their region. And they fear the Jews’ existence as the only democratic country in the Middle East. They feel that we are endangering their culture, their religion, and the structure of their society and regimes. All you have to do is look at the civil wars in Yemen, Syria, and Sudan to know that Israel and the Jews have little to do with the greater regional geopolitical frameworks.

Thus, as longtime Israeli security expert Avi Melamed says, to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, you have to understand North Africa and the Middle East. The region’s larger, more powerful forces dictate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not the other way around.

Somebody should tell the “Israeli Jews” that.

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1. “Why the right-wing Mizrahi vote is misunderstood in Israel.” Middle East Eye.

2. “Palestinian poll shows Hamas widely supported in Gaza, West Bank - analysis.” The Jerusalem Post.