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Opposing Benjamin Netanyahu has become something of a political identity.
For some, it is practically an entire worldview. Ask them what they believe about Israel’s future, and their answer often begins and ends with two words: Not Bibi.
Fair enough. There are legitimate reasons to oppose Netanyahu. But here is the problem: Being against a politician does not tell us what someone is for. Removing a politician from office is a political objective, not a governing philosophy. It tells us who someone does not want leading a country, but remarkably little about what they want that country to become.
Democracies are not supposed to be organized exclusively around personalities. They are supposed to be organized around ideas, principles, priorities, and competing visions for the future. Yet increasingly, political identity is defined less by what people believe than by whom they despise.
And nowhere is the contradiction more obvious today than in Israel, where Gadi Eisenkot, the leader of the Yashar party, has received the mandate to form the next government after October’s election. The irony is that Eisenkot agrees with Netanyahu on many of the most consequential issues facing Israel.
On November 8th, Israeli President Isaac Herzog formally tasked Eisenkot with forming the next government after 67 members of the newly elected Knesset (Israeli parliament) recommended him, compared with 46 who supported Netanyahu. Eisenkot now has 28 days, with the possibility of a 14-day extension, to assemble a coalition capable of governing.
His political rise represents a potentially historic turning point. Netanyahu has dominated Israeli politics for much of the past three decades, and millions of Israelis are understandably eager for a change in leadership. But what exactly will change if Eisenkot succeeds?
Consider the most important issue facing Israel: national security.
Eisenkot, like Netanyahu, opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state under present circumstances. He believes Hamas must be stripped of its military and governing capabilities in Gaza. He believes Iran must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, including through military force if necessary. He supports maintaining Israeli security control in strategically important areas and has defended Israel’s right to conduct military operations against threats beyond its borders. He also supports continued Jewish settlement in parts of Judea and Samaria (also known as the West Bank).
On several of the most consequential questions an Israeli prime minister must confront, Eisenkot and Netanyahu begin from remarkably similar premises. Their differences often concern how these objectives should be achieved, not whether they should be pursued.
So let us not pretend that replacing Netanyahu with Eisenkot represents some wholesale ideological transformation of Israel. The country is not suddenly becoming a different nation, abandoning its security doctrine, embracing Palestinian statehood, or adopting the worldview of those who have spent years demonizing Netanyahu.
In fact, Eisenkot’s own biography underscores this continuity. He served as IDF chief of staff from 2015 to 2019, largely under Netanyahu, helping shape and implement the very national security framework that Israel’s government pursued. He later served in Netanyahu’s wartime cabinet following October 7th before resigning.
The two men are political rivals today, but they are hardly strangers to the same strategic worldview.
None of this means Eisenkot and Netanyahu are interchangeable. On several major domestic issues, they represent genuinely different approaches to governing. That is precisely the point. We can certainly have a policy conversation, policy by policy. But “anti-Netanyahu” is not a policy.
If you believe Israel needs a more independent judiciary, say so. If you believe the ultra-Orthodox should share the burden of national service, make that argument. If you believe Netanyahu’s government failed to adequately plan for Gaza’s future, explain what a better plan would look like. And if you believe a leader who presided over the greatest security catastrophe in modern Israeli history must be held accountable, explain what accountability should entail.
These positions deserve to be debated on their own merits, rather than being reduced to a binary choice between Netanyahu and whoever happens to be running against him.
The contradiction arises when people treat opposition to the man as if it necessarily requires opposition to everything he believes. A good idea does not become a bad idea because Netanyahu supports it. And a bad idea does not become a good idea because Eisenkot proposes it.
Israel is hardly alone in this phenomenon. Across the Atlantic, American politics has become similarly consumed by opposition to Donald Trump. For millions of Americans, being anti-Trump has evolved into a political identity that often seems more important than any particular set of policy beliefs. Entire political campaigns have been built around the promise of defeating Trump, resisting Trump, or preventing another Trump from emerging.
Yet ask many of these voters about specific policies, and the situation becomes considerably more complicated. Take immigration, for example. Plenty of Americans who strongly oppose Trump nevertheless support stricter border enforcement, deporting people who are in the country illegally, and reforming an immigration system that has struggled for decades.
They may object to Trump’s methods, rhetoric, or particular enforcement measures without rejecting the underlying principle that a country has the right to control its borders.
The same dynamic exists across numerous other issues. A person can oppose Trump while supporting domestic manufacturing, a tougher approach toward hostile foreign governments, stronger border security, or greater accountability from America’s international allies. None of those positions belongs exclusively to Trump, just as opposition to them does not automatically make someone anti-Trump.
Yet American political discourse frequently treats agreement with a policy associated with Trump as a form of personal loyalty to him. A proposal is judged not simply by its merits but by whether it might help or hurt the president politically.
The result is a political environment in which people sometimes feel compelled to reject ideas they might otherwise support because those ideas are associated with someone they dislike. That is an absurd way to govern a country.
There is another problem with organizing political movements around opposition to a single person: It is often much easier to unite people against something than to unite them behind something.
Israel’s latest election illustrates this perfectly. Eisenkot’s own political bloc won 48 seats, well short of the 61 required for a governing majority. He received the recommendations of 67 lawmakers because Arab-led parties, which hold 19 seats, also preferred giving him the opportunity to form a government.
But recommending someone to form a government is not the same as agreeing to participate in that government, support its policies, or sustain it through difficult parliamentary votes. Eisenkot now faces the enormous challenge of turning a coalition of people who agree on removing Netanyahu into a coalition of people who agree on governing Israel — and those are two very different propositions.
Think about the ideological distance between some of the parties and politicians whose support Eisenkot may need. Avigdor Liberman’s party and the Left-wing HaDemokratim party have significant disagreements about Israeli society, religion, and the Palestinian question. The Arab-led parties have their own priorities, some of which conflict directly with those of the Jewish Zionist parties.
Eisenkot has attempted to establish common ground through four principles: recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, acceptance of the values of its Declaration of Independence, national service for all citizens, and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization whose military and governing power must be dismantled.
Those principles are meaningful, but they also reveal the central challenge. Some of the very parties whose support he may need have reservations about accepting them.
And even if he manages to assemble a government, what happens when the parties must agree on legislation, budgets, military operations, judicial reform, settlement policy, and the future of Israel’s relationship to Gaza and the West Bank?
The common desire to replace Netanyahu will not resolve those disagreements. In fact, the moment Netanyahu leaves office, the one issue that has united much of the opposition could become considerably less important. That is when the real test of Eisenkot’s leadership will begin.
None of this is an argument that Netanyahu should remain in office. But there is an equally important responsibility on the other side of that equation: Voters should demand more from the people seeking to replace him than the promise of being someone else.
What will an Eisenkot government do differently about Hamas? How will they prevent Iran from rebuilding its rogue nuclear program? What is their realistic long-term strategy for Gaza? How will they balance Israel’s security requirements and its relationship with the United States? What will they do about the cost of living, the burden on IDF reservists, the ultra-Orthodox draft, and growing divisions within parts of Israeli society?
And perhaps most importantly, how will Eisenkot reconcile the policies he shares with Netanyahu with the demands of political partners who oppose some of those very policies?
These are the questions that should determine whether Eisenkot is capable of leading Israel, not merely whether he can assemble enough politicians who dislike Netanyahu.
If anything, the similarities between Eisenkot and Netanyahu on national security should encourage Israelis to recognize something important: Israel has a broader strategic consensus than its bitter political divisions often suggest. There are fundamental principles about the country’s security, sovereignty, and survival that transcend individual politicians and political parties.
That consensus is something to build upon, not something to deny simply because it complicates the preferred political narrative.
Israel does not need its next prime minister to disagree with Netanyahu about everything. It needs its next prime minister to distinguish between what Netanyahu got right and wrong, and what must change for the country to productively move forward.
The same principle applies to Trump, Biden, and virtually every other politician in a functioning democracy. Political opponents should be judged by the ideas they advocate, the decisions they make, and the results they produce, not simply by which political personalities they support or despise — being anti-Netanyahu does not make someone right, any more than being pro-Netanyahu makes someone wrong.
If Eisenkot becomes Israel’s next prime minister, his success will not be measured by how thoroughly he distances himself from Netanyahu. It will be measured by whether Israel becomes safer, stronger, more prosperous, and more united under his leadership.
Israelis may be ready to move on from Netanyahu. But moving on from a politician is not the same as moving forward as a country. And that is the difference between winning an election and effectively governing.



Yitzhak Rabin believed most of the things Gadi Eisenkot believes in, before he was elected in 1992. A year after his election he signed the Oslo Accords with the PLO.
Maybe what they believe in is less important than whether they still believe it after the election.
Voting on the basis of ideas, issues and policies? Too difficult for many people especially here in America where so many refuse to understand much less discuss issues that affect their lives and families and others they pretend to care about
Heres the good news in America if BIBI leaves office. The average anti zionist jew will havd difficulty yelling the name EISENKOT. It doesn't just roll.off ones tongue. And they will be forced to discuss the issues rather than a personality.