Defense experts got Israel wrong.
On questions of war and peace, people must hear from many types of experts.
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The same expert and analytical communities that erred early in the Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran war continues to dominate much of the public and governmental discourse one year into this thing.
Many of them persist in downplaying Israeli chances and counseling against providing weapons to the Jewish state, which has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to use them effectively (not to be confused with perfectly). Some of these “experts” still warn of regional escalation, even as one Iranian red line after another has faded to pink and vanished.
The standard analysis of Israel and its foes paid almost no attention to the documented corruption of the Iranian regime, the chief sponsor of both Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Houthis. A deeply corrupt Iran that can barely keep its domestic affairs in order probably struggles to manage overseas adventures as well.
Many commentators also wrongly compared October 7th to 9/11. Indeed, the similarities are sparse outside of the fact that both antagonists are jihadist terrorist organizations, yet that does not stop such a comparison from following this logic: If these two atrocities are relatively similar, then the responses to them, and the lessons learned from post-9/11 efforts and missteps, should be applied here as well, right?
This is known as reasoning by analogy, which starts with an observation that two or more things are similar in some aspects and ends with the conclusion that they must therefore be similar in many aspects. As a result, this leads to analogies that are misleading, inaccurate, overextended, and overgeneralized.
A more effective way to compare and contrast is called “first principles thinking” — in which you break down complicated issues into fundamental truths, and then reassemble them from the bottom up. In many ways, this is the opposite of reasoning by analogy, a top-down approach that begins with comparing and contrasting facts that are known.
As it pertains to 9/11 and October 7th, we know that the terrorists who executed 9/11 were operating covertly during the attacks, while terrorists who executed October 7th were operating overtly. They literally GoPro’d the attacks and broadcast them on social media platforms, disseminating these atrocities in real-time.
Second, the so-called enemy of the United States during 9/11 was in the Middle East — far, far away from mainland America — while Israel’s enemy is but a hop, skip, and a jump away from the Jewish state’s capital.
Third, the 9/11 attacks featured hijacked airplanes purposely flown into symbolic infrastructure, killing thousands of people. The October 7th attacks, meanwhile, were mainly composed of a ground infiltration enabled by cutting through the security fence that separates Gaza from Israel.
Hijacking airplanes is incredibly difficult to replicate, especially after the tremendous post-9/11 security measures that were immediately imposed on air travel. But a ground infiltration from Gaza into Israel is absolutely replicable, given the highly complex terror tunnel network in Gaza.
And lastly, the perpetrators of 9/11 were not, at least to my understanding, realistically seeking to conquer the United States, whereas the perpetrators of October 7th have, for decades, publicly stated their goal: to completely destroy the Jewish state of Israel, which is feasible (at least in theory) because it is 100 times smaller than the U.S. and has enemies on every single one of its borders (except for the Mediterranean Sea, the body of water into which Israel’s self-declared enemies explicitly vow to drive the Jews).
In the immediate aftermath of October 7th, U.S. generals flew to Israel to warn the IDF against a ground incursion into Gaza. They tried to scare Israel by “predicting” that it would lose some 20 soldiers per day. The actual number is fewer than two.
Early on in the war, Israeli military chief Herzi Halevi told the U.S. that there would be even more Palestinian casualties if Israel took the advice of U.S. generals who were sent to advise Israel on the Gaza operation.
In recent weeks, the U.S. and France have been imploring Israel to refrain from a ground incursion into southern Lebanon to push Hezbollah away from Israel’s border and remain disarmed north of the Litani River. This is, of course, in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which was passed after Hezbollah launched a major cross-border attack in 2006 and a 33-day war ensued.
The resolution prohibited “armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon” and called for “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that … there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.”
Those words — “the Lebanese State” and “the Government of Lebanon” — should have made it clear from the get-go that an Israeli offensive campaign would be necessary not long after 2006. Instead, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (and the accompanying U.S. policy of strengthening Lebanese state institutions) “became a fig leaf for Iran to boost Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capability on Israel’s border,” according to Michael Makovsky, a former U.S. Defense Department official.1
In other words, it was so obviously inevitable that Israel would at some point have to execute a ground incursion into southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah has spent the last 18 years violating UN Security Council Resolution 1701 by fortifying its terrorist positions along the Israeli-Lebanese border.
A 2018 report by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America stated that, at the outset of a conflict with Israel, Hezbollah would be capable of firing at least 3,000 rockets per day, and then settling in on 1,000 to 1,500 per day. During the last war between Israel and Hezbollah, in 2006, the terror group fired 200 rockets per day.
Truth be told, the Third Israel-Hezbollah War actually began a month ago, when Shaldag, one of the premier Israeli Air Force commando units, raided and destroyed a Hezbollah missile production facility built inside a mountain in Syria. Then followed the unprecedented pager and walkie-talkie attacks that Israel allegedly launched against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria — injuring at least 3,000 Hezbollah operatives — as well as assassinations of the terror group’s top brass, most notably its chief, Hassan Nasrallah.
During the last five weeks, Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel have slightly increased in amount, range, and damage — amounting to between 100 and 200 per day — but they do not remotely match the uptick in actions that Israel has unleashed. Israel significantly upped the ante and Hezbollah cannot keep up.
Even when Hezbollah tries to launch rockets at Israel, the IDF preemptively attacks on weapons stores and missile launchers, greatly minimizing the output. In instances when Hezbollah does successfully send a volley toward Israel, the IDF almost instantly detects the source of fire and counterattacks to destroy it.
Overall, the Israelis have had their way with Hezbollah, far more than “experts” had forecasted.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often branded as one of the central issues in Middle Eastern geopolitics, but it is actually the region’s broader geopolitical dynamics that shape, exacerbate, and elongate this conflict. I learned this pivotal distinction from Avi Melamed, a former Israeli intelligence official and senior official on Arab Affairs, who now runs “Inside The Middle East,” an educational nonprofit organization.
As such, the Middle East is characterized by a complex web of power struggles and alliances. Countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey are regional powers vying for influence. Iran’s support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas is part of its broader strategy to extend its hegemonic master plan and counterbalance rivals like Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, historically supported Palestinian causes but has recently shifted towards a more pragmatic stance, seeking both covert and overt alliances with Israel to counter the burgeoning Iranian threat. This shifting dynamic influences how Palestinian factions receive support and how they position themselves politically and militarily.
Yet it is often so-called “experts” who fail to explain this broader context and how crucial it is to comprehending the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“You should never trust experts,” wrote the late-19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury. “If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome. If you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent. If you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense.”
“Israel’s Great Strategic Failure.” Tablet.
Surprise! Israel has never had the full-throated support for any of its military operations. At each one Israel was told "don't do it" and/or had difficulty in obtaining matériel and weapons. Rinse. Repeat.
I am most likely wrong, but it appears the West fully supports Israel only when it aligns with the West's current interests (cf Harris/Walz) or there is low risk of a fully engaged shooting war.
Douglas Murray recently said, the IDF is magnificent! I hope you all know who he is and believe what he says because it is true. Everyone must stop telling Israel how to fight this war. They are doing it “magnificently.” Thank you Joshua for making us smarter.