Hezbollah is weak. Israel should crush them.
Hezbollah is weak. Israel should crush them.
In the Arab-mentality landscape of the Middle East, weakness is an invitation to be more aggressive. It would be wise for Israel to seize the opportunity.
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In the Middle East, where the Arab mentality is deeply ingrained, perceptions of strength and weakness play a pivotal role in shaping interpersonal and geopolitical interactions.
This cultural framework often equates displays of power and assertiveness with respect and authority, while any sign of weakness can be interpreted as an invitation for increased aggression. It is a dynamic evident in various aspects of life, from personal relationships and business dealings, to national politics and international relations.
Historically, the tribal and clan-based societies of the Middle East have emphasized honor, strength, and resilience. These values continue to influence contemporary Arab societies, where maintaining a strong facade is crucial for gaining and preserving status and influence.
In such an environment, showing weakness can lead to exploitation and dominance by rivals, whether in a family dispute or a broader political conflict. Consequently, individuals and nations alike often adopt aggressive postures to deter potential threats and to project power.
This cultural inclination towards aggressiveness in response to perceived weakness can be seen in the region’s geopolitical landscape. States and non-state actors frequently engage in displays of military might and assertive diplomacy to assert their dominance and protect their interests.
For instance, political leaders might adopt hardline stances in negotiations or engage in military interventions to avoid being seen as weak. This behavior is driven by the belief that only through demonstrating strength can they secure their position and deter adversaries.
Hence why, since the October 7th Hamas-led massacres, a diplomatic solution has not prevailed with regard to the growing Israel-Hezbollah military escalation on the Israeli-Lebanon border.
The near-daily tit-for-tat attacks have resulted in 10 civilian deaths on the Israeli side, as well as the deaths of 15 IDF soldiers and reservists. In addition, thousands of Israelis have been evacuated from their homes on the Israeli-Lebanon border and do not feel safe returning until Hezbollah is no longer positioned on the Israeli border.
The U.S. and France, which has significant interests in Lebanon, have been trying for months to conjure up a diplomatic solution to the ongoing military tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, but to no avail. Perhaps this is another lesson in the incessantly failing approach of “Western conventional wisdom” in the Middle East.
Many Israelis want the country to deal with Hezbollah militarily, but like Hamas, the former is a genocidal, caliphate-aspiring death cult that does not play by the “rules of war.” Nothing is off limits — not even Israel’s offshore gas rigs, as Hassan Nasrallah (the head of Hezbollah) insinuated on Wednesday. To add insult to injury, the terror group has a significantly larger arsenal than Hamas, and it can easily reach all of Israel.
But Nasrallah made a major mistake in his flamboyant comments this week: He also threatened Cyprus for the first time, saying it had been allowing Israel to use its airports and bases for military exercises and that Hezbollah could consider it “a part of the war” and strike the island if it allows the IDF to use logistical infrastructure to attack Hezbollah.
Cyprus is not known to offer any land or base facilities to the Israeli military, but has in the past allowed Israel to use its airspace to occasionally conduct air drills, though never during conflict.1
Thus, Nasrallah’s decision to randomly group Cyprus into his threats is a major sign of weakness, a sort of desperate attempt to put more international pressure on Israel to halt its military operations before achieving any semblance of victory as it defends itself in this two-front war.
Much less has been reported in international media about the Israel-Hezbollah portion of this conflict, but in Hebrew media, news has consistently shown that the Israelis are having their way with the terror group. What’s more, it has been clear to Israel that Hezbollah and its chief sponsor, Iran, do not want an escalation — and are avoiding it.2
At the same time, Israel’s policy toward Hezbollah in Lebanon over the past two decades appears to be a major strategic failure. Hezbollah vastly augmented its arsenal from about 10,000 rockets at the end of its 2006 war with Israel, to today’s 150,000-to-200,000 range, plus several hundred precision-guided munitions and an array of Iranian-made attack drones.3
“Indeed, it is the more powerful Hezbollah in Lebanon, whose border with Israel had been generally quiet from 2006 until October 7th, that poses the far more potent strategic threat to the Jewish state, both in the damage it can inflict and the protection it offers Iran’s nuclear program,” according to Michael Makovsky, a former U.S. Defense Department official.
At the outset of a conflict with Israel, today’s version of Hezbollah would be capable of firing at least 3,000 rockets per day, and then settling in on 1,000-to-1,500 per day. Comparatively, in the 2006 war, Hezbollah fired 200 rockets per day.
“In a war, Hezbollah could overwhelm the air defense capabilities of Israel, a small country with little strategic depth, causing unimaginable damage to strategic targets and population centers,” added Makovsky. “Israel would have to determine which strategic sites and cities to protect and which to leave vulnerable and evacuate.”
Historically, Hezbollah is not in Lebanon to launch a war against Israel, but to help deter Israel, or give it pause, from attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. Indeed, Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal exists precisely to defend Iran and its most valuable nuclear assets by threatening to let loose against Israel should it ever target them.
“And now Iran is on the verge of becoming a nuclear threshold state, which is an unmitigated strategic disaster for Israel that could threaten its very existence,” wrote Makovsky. “By playing it safe in Lebanon, Israel ended up in a worse situation on both fronts.”
Years ago Israel could have launched a military campaign, not to destroy Hezbollah but to materially degrade its military capabilities. Israel would likely have needed to use ample ground forces and air power. It could have legitimized such an initiative upon enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which marked the end of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
UNSCR 1701 prohibited “armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon” and called for “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that … there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.”
Those words — “the Lebanese State” and “the Government of Lebanon” — should have made it clear from the get-go that an Israeli offensive campaign would be necessary not long after 2006. Instead, UNSCR 1701 (and the accompanying U.S. policy of strengthening Lebanese state institutions) “became a fig leaf for Iran to boost Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capability on Israel’s border,” according to Makovsky.
Israel is now in a position whereby it has international legitimacy to conduct a preemptive campaign to degrade Hezbollah in Lebanon, which comes with an added bonus: By diminishing Hezbollah’s threat to Israel, the Jewish state builds more leverage for if and when it wants to take military action against another antisemitic genocidal foe: the Islamic Republic of Iran.
“Nasrallah says ‘no place’ in Israel would be safe in war, threatens to target Cyprus.” The Times of Israel.
“Analysts: Hezbollah reluctant to fall into Israel’s all-out war trap in Lebanon.” United Press International.
“Israel’s Great Strategic Failure.” Tablet.
First logical explanation I've seen of why Hezbollah threatened Cyprus
My late husband, a Sabra and an IDF veteran, told me about an incident he experienced while working as a seaman for an Israeli merchant line. An Arab seaman who was also employed there bullied my husband constantly - verbally and physically - when no one was around to witness this. Fed up, my husband got himself some brass knuckles and literally punched the guy senseless. Astoundingly, when the guy recovered, he greeted my husband as a "long lost friend" - and, indeed, they were great pals after that. My husband came to the conclusion - from this experience and other ones (not quite as dramatic) - that you MUST show strength to Arabs. They respect this. Applying Western psychology and other pacifist strategies DOES NOT WORK.