How to Think About the Dramatic Firing of Israel's Defense Minister
On Tuesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu relieved Yoav Gallant of his duties — in the midst of Israel's seven-front war.
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On Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fired Defense Minister Yoav Gallant — who he appointed to the position back in 2022 — citing a lack of mutual trust during wartime.
An Israeli defense minister has never been fired during a war. I do not include this fact to imply anything, but it is noteworthy and, as they say, there is a first time for everything.
If you have been paying attention to Israeli politics since October 7th, then you know that the firing of Gallant was months in the making and just a matter of time, postponed again and again due to dynamic wartime conditions such as Israeli assassinations of high-profile enemies, hostage negotiations, and Iran’s missile attacks on the Jewish state.
Since October 7th, Gallant has gained particular respect as a popular, professional defense minister. The only outfit he wore during the past 13 months was a jet-black dress shirt with black buttons, a black undershirt, black pants held up with a military nylon black belt, and black shoes as modest as a priest’s uniform.
The hollowed garb screamed grief, magnitude, and personal atonement by the retired general and 30-year IDF veteran, who was Israel’s top civilian security official on the deadliest day in its history.
“How do you know he’s a military person?” asked Nira Yadin, one of Gallant’s former political aides. “Because he can live a whole day on two dates.” As an officer in Shayetet 13 (one of the Israeli Navy’s elite units) leading up to the 1982 Israel-Lebanon War, Gallant and those under his command swam distances to the enemy shoreline that a unit comrade of his would not disclose even 40 years later.1
That he continued to don all black demonstrates the war’s objectives have still not been accomplished, which means there are still a quarter-million internally displaced Israelis, hundreds of thousands of soldiers mobilized, and 130 hostages (many of them dead) in Gaza. It also means there are still Israeli soldiers dying in Gaza and Lebanon nearly every day (though these numbers have been impressively low thus far).
Here is how, in part, Netanyahu presented his firing of Gallant to the Israeli public (translated from Hebrew) on Tuesday evening:
“In the midst of a war, more than ever, full trust between the prime minister and the defense minister is required. Unfortunately, even though in the early months of the campaign there was such trust and very productive cooperation, in recent months, that trust has cracked.”
“Between me and Defense Minister Gallant, significant gaps emerged regarding the management of the campaign, and these gaps were accompanied by statements and actions that contradicted government decisions and cabinet decisions.”
“I made many attempts to bridge these gaps, but they only widened. They even became known to the public in an inappropriate manner, and worse still, they reached our enemies — who took pleasure in this and derived significant benefit from it.”
These choice words — blaming Gallant for helping Israel’s enemies — come at a particular interesting time. This past weekend, headline news broke about a possible scandal emanating out of the Prime Minister’s Office in which several suspects from this office, the Shin Bet (Israel’s domestic intelligence agency), and the IDF were arrested for questioning in connection with an ongoing investigation into the alleged deliberate leak of classified documents from Prime Minister’s Office operatives.
This potential scandal is especially newsworthy in Israel because, among other reasons, such a deliberate leak surely harmed Israeli soldiers and the hostages (if it indeed occurred).
Then, also on Tuesday, an Israeli court cleared for publication that an additional probe is being conducted, by the police’s Lahav 433 investigation unit, into “criminal incidents” last year reportedly linked to wartime meetings. Lahav 433 investigates serious crimes including public corruption.
While most of the new case’s details remain under a gag order, Netanyahu appeared to confirm that the investigation, which has been in progress for some six months, concerned his office, releasing a statement blasting it as “an unprecedented hunting expedition against the Prime Minister’s Office in the midst of a war.”
Perhaps Netanyahu’s firing of Gallant was made in an effort to divert attention from these front-page scandals emerging out of the Prime Minister’s Office.
Another way to think about Gallant’s dismissal is as a political move. Both Gallant and Netanyahu, among others, have been at the highest levels of Israel’s leadership for much of the past 15 years.
Those familiar with the thinking of 65-year-old Gallant do not believe that he wants Netanyahu’s job, though in the endless chaos of Israeli politics, he might find himself with it anyway. When the political career of 75-year-old Netanyahu inevitably ends, or when a new election cycle takes place — whichever comes first — Gallant would be one candidate perfectly capable of seizing the political moment, thanks at least in part to the massive military achievements notched under Gallant’s leadership since October 7th.
In this case, Gallant would likely defect from Likud, the party in which he has been a member and Netanyahu chairs, to start his own party. Such is common practice in Israeli politics. For those less knowledgeable about our political landscape, the country regularly has dozens of political parties all vying for 120 Knesset (parliament) seats. And whoever chairs the party that receives the most seats (according to a popular vote) becomes prime minister in most cases.
Another way to think about Gallant’s firing is an attempt to give total legitimacy to segments of Israeli society that evade compulsory IDF service. For Netanyahu, some Israelis claim, the tipping point fell when it became clear that Gallant would not fully cooperate with the evasion laws.
You see, the prime minister’s governing coalition depends on the support of two ultra-Orthodox parties which have been insisting that the government legislate to preserve the exclusion of most ultra-Orthodox Jews from military service.
Netanyahu has been experiencing great challenges in mustering a majority for such legislation, and Gallant — aware that the standing army and reserves are under extraordinary strain, and that the IDF needs all the recruits it can get — led the opposition to this legislation. Israel Katz, who Netanyahu has installed as the next defense minister, is expected to dutifully abide by the prime minister’s wishes on this and other issues.”
Thus, there is the argument that Netanyahu’s firing of Gallant was a political move designed to not endanger the former’s governing coalition from falling apart and Israel going to early elections.
However, such is politics in a democratic state. Netanyahu, whose party won the last election in 2022, has every right to hire and fire whomever he wants for whatever reasons he has in mind at whatever time he so pleases. That is the power vested in him and any other Israeli prime minister by the public, via the virtue of democracy.
To label Netanyahu’s firing of Gallant during a consequential war as wildly political is, to be frank, naive. The reality is that there are four continuities in the nature of war, chiefly that war is political. I learned this from John Spencer, an urban warfare expert who served for more than 25 years in the U.S. military.
This means that those in charge of a country at war are constantly making political decisions with regard to why and how they choose to fight the war. Indeed, there is no such thing as objective “right” and “wrong” in much of war, just a difference of political perspectives and opinions. Whoever has the most leverage — both within a country at war and across international relations — tends to get what they want and how they want it. Such is politics, a necessary evil.
Another way to think about Gallant’s dismissal is that, according to some Left-leaning commentators in Israel, Netanyahu is trying to consolidate power into his hands. Reports also surfaced Tuesday suggesting that the prime minister will soon fire the heads of the Shin Bet and IDF as well (again, old news that kept getting postponed due to dynamic wartime conditions).
Certainly, this interpretation can inspire images of autocracy and dictators. But, we should honor both sides of this coin. Another way to think about decision-making consolidation — especially in a time of war — is that quick, singular-minded decisions tend to be more effective in working to achieve the stated war aims.
Whichever interpretation feels more accurate to a spectator — consolidation for the sake of autocracy or for the sake of effective decision-making — largely depends on the biases this spectator already holds. In other words, Left-leaning people will probably perceive the Center-Right Netanyahu and his Likud party as trying to consolidate power for autocratic or otherwise nefarious reasons, whereas Right-leaning folks are more likely to see this firing of Gallant as a more efficient way to achieve the stated war aims.
As a centrist, I do not agree with any of these interpretations. Actually, I think it is too early to tell what will become of this decision to relieve Gallant of his duties; whether or not it will be positive for Israel, both within the context of this war and for the country in general.
We know that Netanyahu, like virtually every politician on this planet, wants to hold on to his seat. These political calculations are in no way unique to Netanyahu, and scolding Netanyahu in these terms — while overlooking other politicians in other places who do much of the same thing — is nothing short of a ridiculous double standard (if not in intention then in outcome).
We also know that, under Netanyahu’s direction throughout this war, Israel has made remarkable, game-changing achievements. For one thing, Hamas and Hezbollah have become a shadow of what they were prior to October 7th, with their leadership extensively eliminated, and other Iranian proxies like the Houthis in Yemen are now well aware of what their fate will be should they poke the Israeli bear.
In addition, Iran’s decades-long mega-strategy of surrounding Israel with non-state actors has rather quickly gone up in flames, leaving the Iranian regime extremely vulnerable. This has tremendous implications for the entire Middle East and, frankly, much of the world that depends on (or is somehow connected to) Middle Eastern natural resources.
Under Netanyahu’s leadership, Israel has also successfully managed to ward off the increasingly strong antisemitic waves (i.e. ridiculous double standards) levied at the Jewish state from other countries and their leaders — all while fighting an existential war on seven fronts (Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran) that Hamas started with Iran’s direct guidance.
Within Israel, the IDF, Shin Bet, Mossad (foreign intelligence agency), and other agencies have been collaborating almost flawlessly, perhaps best indicated by the extremely low numbers of Israeli casualties (both soldiers and civilians) in more than a year’s worth of this multi-front war. What’s more, 117 hostages have been returned alive to Israel, with 105 being released in a prisoner exchange deal, four released by Hamas unilaterally, and eight rescued by Israeli forces.
If we are being intellectually honest, we have to give all Israeli leadership, including Netanyahu, credit for these achievements and others. The same way that they are all, including Netanyahu, responsible for the missteps leading up to, during, and after October 7th. And there have been many missteps. Anyone who was in a leadership position in Israel leading up to, during, and after October 7th must be held accountable as part of a formal state commission.
When this state commission ought to take place is up for debate in Israel. Some argue that it should have already started, while others contend that we ought to wait until after the war ends — and it will end, sooner or later, as all wars do. Those who argue that this state commission should have already started suggest that Netanyahu is purposely prolonging the war to distance himself from October 7th and cover his tracks, so that the state commission will show exponentially less fault on his part.
This might be true — but it could also be true that Netanyahu has a masterplan in the works for Israel to resoundingly win this war against these genocidal jihadists, which would be a huge victory for the entire Western world as well. After 13 months of war, this “masterplan” (which I am sure exists in some form or fashion) seems to be progressing pretty darn well for Israel and its place in one of the most important regions of the world (all things considered).
All I am saying is that we should acknowledge these impressive feats, even if Netanyahu or his party or governing coalition is not exactly your “cup of tea.”
A few months ago, I reached out to a handful of Israelis whose opinion I very much appreciate. I asked them a simple question: Do you think Netanyahu is doing a good job since October 7th?
One of these Israelis — she used to work for many years high up in one of Israel’s security establishments, and she is politically a centrist — wrote to me:
“I personally believe that Netanyahu’s conduct on all levels — military, political, public — exists in conjunction with one central factor, and that is Netanyahu’s legacy. Whether he takes responsibility or not, it doesn’t matter, because Netanyahu knows that he is currently in the history books for the most terrible failure in the history of Israel and the Jewish People since the Holocaust. For any leader it is terrible, and all the more so for Netanyahu who brands himself as ‘Mr. Security’ and defender of Israel.”
Rosen, Armin. “Israel’s Man in Black.” Tablet.
The IDF brass which sold the country on the idea of a smaller and smarter IDF snd reliance on high tech snd who as in 1973 ignored and disdained intelligence should resign Their performance was as awful as the US naval brass before Pearl Harbor the French brass who thought that the Maginot Line was impregnable and the British who never thought that Singapore would be conquered by land
" under Netanyahu’s direction throughout this war, Israel has made remarkable, game-changing achievements"
With Yoav Gallant as Defense Minister. It's too early to do a Stalinist airbrushing of his contributions.
Netanyahu's main achievement, in my view, was to stand up to crack-pot ideas like setting up a Palestinian state in exchange for Saudi ties, or the three-stage Gaza withdrawal that would allow Hamas to restore its power.
That he is in the clutches of the ultra-orthodox parties during the war is in part due to opposition members who came from Likud but refuse to work with it while Netanyahu is PM. Gideon Saar, until recently, was in that group. They forced Netanyahu to rely on the ultra-orthodox.
Naftali Bennet was a talented, successful PM and the fact that, unlike 2021, there were no Israeli-Arab demonstrations, is in part thanks to his inclusive government. Avigdor Lieberman has been an astute and prescient Foreign and Defense minister. Fortunately, Israel has plenty of talent and, with a good friend back in the White House, can look to a post-Netanyahu era with confidence.
The treatment of a distinguished and dedicated officer like Yoav Gallant, is a disgrace.