If Israel was a mistake, then what about Lebanon?
As "anti-Zionists" question the legitimacy of the Jewish state, they ignore a far more compelling case study in artificial borders, sectarian division, and national failure.
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This is a guest essay by Ben Koan, who writes the newsletter, “The Thousand-Year View.”
You can also listen to the podcast version of this essay on Apple Podcasts, YouTube Music, YouTube, and Spotify.
The post-October 7th wars have brought renewed fervor to “anti-Zionism,” a counterfactual movement to undo the creation of the Jewish state.
But if we’re questioning the legitimacy of Middle Eastern states, why stop at Israel?
Every country in the Levant was carved out of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Each has borders that were drawn by European powers. The latest Middle Eastern hostilities pit Israel (an economic, technological, and military powerhouse) against Hezbollah (a theocratic, Iranian-sponsored militia in a tribally fractured failed state).
By the metric of national success, then, the opportune question is not whether Israel should exist. It’s whether Lebanon was a mistake.
After all, Lebanon is perhaps the only post-colonial state whose people have petitioned for a return to foreign rule. Its politics are corrupt, sectarian, and foreign-dominated. Its economy is marked by GDP contraction, hyperinflation, and soaring unemployment.
Lebanon has not just been stricken by crisis and war; it is fundamentally prone to crisis and war by its very nature. Though it may be too late to undo the errors of its foundation, other countries can still learn from Lebanon’s historic, ongoing state failure.
Today’s map of the Middle East was largely drawn by Britain and France after their victory in World War I. The Ottoman Empire, which formerly controlled most of the region, had sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary and was dismembered as a result. As historian David Fromkin noted:
“What was real in the Ottoman Empire tended to be local: a tribe, a clan, a sect, or a town was the true political unit to which loyalties adhered.”1
Modern states like Iraq and Syria were not incipient nations yearning to be free. Instead, they were created as European (technically League of Nations) mandates to reflect European interests. Jordan, for example, largely originated as a consolation prize for the Hashemite dynasty, which had sided with the British but was driven out of the Arabian Peninsula by the House of Saud.
The British formed “Palestine” out of several different Ottoman districts to help safeguard the Suez Canal and serve as a “national home for the Jewish People” (per the Balfour Declaration, which was partly motivated by a desire to win Jewish support during the war). Insofar as Palestine’s Arab population was politically organized, it called for incorporation into a broader Syrian Arab state.
Lebanon had a more substantial raison d’être than many of its neighbors. The French were the traditional champions of the Maronites, a Christian ethnoreligious group located around Mount Lebanon. Following sectarian conflict, Western pressure led to the creation of an autonomous Maronite district within the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.
During World War I, the Ottomans massacred their empire’s Armenian population, which gave renewed impetus to the need for Western powers to protect local Christians. In 1920, Lebanon was subsequently founded as a Maronite-dominant enclave under French control.
Yet for historical and economic reasons, the Maronites urged, and the French granted, the creation of a “Greater Lebanon” that extended beyond their Christian (and Druze) mountain redoubt. Thus the Mandate of Lebanon included substantial Sunni and Shi’ite Muslim populations.
According to a 1932 census, its population was 51.2 percent Christian, 22.4 percent Sunni, 19.6 percent Shi’ite, and 6.8 percent Druze. The Lebanese political system was explicitly designed to reflect the country’s sectarian divisions.
Per the 1943 National Pact, the Maronites were granted the presidency, command of the armed forces, and a parliamentary majority; the Sunnis had the role of prime minister; the Shi’ites were given speaker of parliament; and the Druze and Greek Orthodox Christians were promised lesser positions.
The Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990 brought the country’s internal tensions to a boil. The poorer, faster-growing Muslims resented the Maronites’ political dominance, which was guaranteed by the National Pact but reflected an outdated census. The National Pact had promised that the Maronites wouldn’t seek Western intervention and that the Muslims wouldn’t aspire to unite with other Arab countries.
Yet geopolitically, Maronites sided with the Western world, Sunnis (and pan-Arabist Greek Orthodox Christians) turned to their Arab neighbors, Shi’ites were loyal to their co-religionists in Iran, and the Druze looked out for themselves. An influx of Palestinians ensnared Lebanon in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and further complicated the country’s demographics and foreign loyalties.
A coalition of Muslims and leftists demanded a new census and constitutional changes, the national army fell apart, and Beirut, once called the “Paris of the Middle East,” turned into a battlefield. The civil war’s inter- and intra-sectional warfare ultimately drew in Syria, Israel, Iran, and Iraq. It ended with the renegotiation of the National Pact (reducing Christian power) and the disarmament of armed factions — with the notable exception of Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shi’ite militia that continues to provoke Israel.
Today, Lebanon is estimated to be 32.4 percent Christian, 31.9 percent Sunni, 31.2 percent Shi’ite, and 4.5 percent Druze. Many Christians — generally wealthier and more educated than their neighbors — have immigrated to Western countries. Thus Lebanon’s original case for existence, as a safe haven for the Maronites, has been rendered obsolete.
Though the civil war is over, Lebanon remains a failed state, subject to political paralysis, sectarian division, foreign intervention, and economic decline. It’s not a showcase for religious pluralism and multicultural harmony. Instead, it’s a cautionary example of the need for functioning states to have a majority nationality. That nationality does not necessarily need to belong to a single religion or ethnicity. But it needs to primarily identify itself with the nation.
Lebanon was doomed to fail because only the Christians typically saw themselves as Lebanese first, and there weren’t enough of them to keep the country stable. Even the Christians were divided, with the majority Maronites loyal to Lebanese nationhood and many minority Greek Orthodox drawn to pan-Arabism. Lack of Christian numerical strength and cohesion also made other groups, like the Druze, less compelled to close ranks with them out of their own sectarian self-interest.
At its inception, Lebanon could have been established as a smaller, more religiously homogeneous state. This compact Lebanon could have extended into the Christian-majority Wadi al-Nasara (“Valley of the Christians”) in present-day Syria, instead of its current Muslim-majority territory. The Lebanese Christians are largely Maronite, whereas Syrian Christians are largely Greek Orthodox, so this alternative Lebanon would have needed to forge a pan-Christian, neo-Aramean identity (and reject pan-Arabism in turn).
That identity could have been strengthened by a policy to encourage the immigration of other Middle Eastern Christians, such as the persecuted Aramaic speakers of Iraq. A Christian “right of return” would simply have reversed the original process by which Muslims achieved numerical dominance. As historian Philip Jenkins wrote:
“From the earliest days of the Muslim expansion, new regimes sponsored the migration of Arab and Muslim peoples into what had been Coptic or Syriac territories, reducing the relative power of older-stock populations and their cultures — and faiths.”2
A homegrown Christian Zionism might have mitigated the dramatic decline of Christianity in the Middle East, from around 14 percent of the region’s population in 1914 to under 5 percent today.
The original impetus for Greater Lebanon was largely economic: The Maronites sought ports and more arable land. But there are no financial upsides to a collapsed country. A cohesive Christian nation-state would have been rich in human capital and pro-Western in orientation — a recipe for foreign investment and economic success.
Lebanon’s failure has immediate lessons for its more successful neighbor, Israel. Jews are a clear national majority outside of the West Bank and Gaza. But in the Holy Land as a whole, they are under 50 percent of the population — closer to Lebanon’s Christians before that country’s civil war.
Also, like Lebanon’s pan-Arabist Christians, the Jews include a minority (non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox) who question the legitimacy of their own state. Jewish ambitions of a Greater Israel, like Maronite visions of a Greater Lebanon, are thus doomed by demographics.
On the other political extreme, dreams of a binational state must contend with the sobering reality of sectarian Lebanon. At least Muslim irredentists like Hamas, whose goal is an ethnically cleansed “Palestine,” recognize the untenability of a state with no clear majority.
Lebanon is also a warning to the West more broadly. According to progressive mantra, “Diversity is our strength.”
But diversity absent a unifying force — such as national identity — leads to internal conflict and consequent weakness. Because of its split demographics, Lebanon was a weak state before it was a failed state. Its weakness made it vulnerable to foreign interference, which imperils the country to this day. Hezbollah fires rockets at Israel on behalf of its sectarian benefactor, Iran, not out of any Lebanese national interest.
True Lebanese nationalists, now a minority in their own country, are powerless to stop them.
When the bulwark that identifies with its own country’s interests loses majority status, that country is effectively over. This bulwark can be strengthened by immigration, if it involves incorporating newcomers into the national project. But the nationalist majority can also be weakened by immigration, if sectionalism is imported into once-cohesive countries.
Of course, sectionalism can also develop organically through extreme political polarization. A country can start off as flawed as Lebanon, but it can also turn into Lebanon over time, if demographics are allowed to become destiny and the center cannot hold.
As for the question of whether Lebanon should exist, the answer is that it doesn’t. Outsiders are apt to confuse the map for the territory, the semblance of a nation (demarcated territory and a flag) for the reality. But Lebanon has become a mere assemblage of tribes — most of which see the country, to quote the Maronite patriarch, as “real estate, not a homeland.”
Lebanon only survives as a nominally independent nation because the American-led world order upholds the principle of established borders. Thus a U.S.-led coalition fought to keep Iraq from absorbing Kuwait. But as Russia’s attempt to conquer Ukraine demonstrates, the international “rules-based” order is fragile and prone to challenge.
Notably, an equally expansionist Iran backs Russia in its bid for neo-Tsarist empire. In the words of neoconservative scholar Robert Kagan, the jungle (i.e., an explicitly strength-based international order) is growing back. Israel may be the Middle Eastern nation that is continually threatened with annihilation, but unlike Lebanon, it has a unifying national identity, a sense of collective purpose, and a demonstrated will to survive.
In a century’s time, the Middle Eastern country most likely to disappear from the map isn’t Israel. It’s Lebanon.
David Fromkin, “A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914–1922” (1989), p. 36.
Philip Jenkins, “The Lost History of Christianity” (2008), p. 212.
Brilliant historical explanation. Thank you.
So, the Arab population of the Palestine mandate grew from 1.2 million in 1948 to 2.8 million (Judea/Samaria aka West Bank) plus 2.2 million (Gaza) plus 2.1 million (Israeli Arab citizens), totaling 7.1 million. (WORST GENOCIDE EVER). The Jewish population is roughly the same, so not less than 50%, although the point is still valid. Note that very few Israelis have any interest in governing the Gaza hellhole, so subtracting that demographic means there is still a substantial Jewish majority even if Judea//Samaria is fully annexed, which again few support (partial annexation of Area C more viable).