Make no mistake, the Israel-Hezbollah war has already begun.
Make no mistake, the Israel-Hezbollah war has already begun.
Much less has been reported in international media about the Israel-Hezbollah portion of this conflict. Soon, seemingly, it will replace the Israel-Hamas war as the Middle East's major conflict.
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In the Middle East, where the Arab mentality is deeply ingrained, perceptions of strength and weakness play a pivotal role in shaping interpersonal and geopolitical interactions.
This cultural framework often equates displays of power and assertiveness with respect and authority, while any sign of weakness can be interpreted as an invitation for increased aggression. It is a dynamic evident in various aspects of life, from personal relationships and business dealings, to national politics and international relations.
Historically, the tribal and clan-based societies of the Middle East have emphasized honor (and with it, shame). These values continue to influence contemporary Arab societies, where maintaining a strong front is crucial for gaining and preserving status and influence.
In such an environment, showing weakness can lead to exploitation and dominance by rivals, whether in a family dispute or a broader political conflict. Consequently, individuals and nations alike often adopt aggressive postures to deter potential threats and to project power.
This cultural inclination towards aggressiveness in response to perceived weakness can be seen in the region’s geopolitical landscape. States and non-state actors frequently engage in displays of military might and assertive diplomacy to assert their dominance and protect their interests.
For instance, political leaders might adopt hardline stances in negotiations or engage in military interventions to avoid being seen as weak. This behavior is driven by the belief that only through demonstrating strength can they secure their position and deter adversaries.
Hence why, since the October 7th Hamas-led massacres and kidnappings, a diplomatic solution has not prevailed with regard to the growing Israel-Hezbollah military escalation on the Israeli-Lebanese border.
The near-daily tit-for-tat attacks have resulted in at least 60,000 Israelis evacuated from their homes in northern Israel — and they do not feel safe returning until Hezbollah is no longer positioned just kilometers from their places of residence on the Israeli-Lebanese border.
The U.S. and France, which has significant interests in Lebanon, have been trying for months to conjure up a diplomatic solution to the ongoing military tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, but to no avail. Perhaps this is another lesson in the incessantly failing approach of “Western conventional wisdom” in the Middle East.
Many Israelis want the country to deal with Hezbollah militarily, but like Hamas, the former is a genocidal, Caliphate-aspiring death cult that does not play by the “rules of war.” Nothing is off limits — not even Israel’s offshore gas rigs, as Hassan Nasrallah (the head of Hezbollah) recently insinuated. To add insult to injury, the terror group has a significantly larger arsenal than Hamas, and it can easily reach all of Israel.
An unnamed security source told Israel’s Channel 12 news on Friday that Israel “should prepare for a long war” in the north that could incur heavy costs. Israel has expressed openness to a diplomatic solution to the conflict, but has said it would launch an all-out war against Hezbollah to restore security to the north if an agreement is not reached.
The last several days have seen a substantial increase in cross-border fire, with Hezbollah launching hundreds of rockets, missiles, and drones into Israel since Wednesday. So far, since October, the skirmishes have resulted in 26 civilian deaths on the Israeli side, as well as the deaths of 20 IDF soldiers and reservists. There have also been several attacks from Syria, without any injuries.
Much less has been reported in international media about the Israel-Hezbollah portion of this conflict, but in Hebrew media, news has consistently shown that the Israelis are having their way with the terror group. What’s more, it has been clear to Israel that Hezbollah and its chief sponsor, Iran, do not want an escalation — and are avoiding it.1
At the same time, Israel’s policy toward Hezbollah in Lebanon over the past two decades appears to be a major strategic failure. Hezbollah vastly augmented its arsenal from about 10,000 rockets at the end of its 2006 war with Israel, to today’s 150,000-to-200,000 range, plus several hundred precision-guided munitions and an array of Iranian-made attack drones.2
At the outset of a conflict with Israel, today’s version of Hezbollah would be capable of firing at least 3,000 rockets per day, and then settling in on 1,000-to-1,500 per day. Comparatively, in the 2006 war, Hezbollah fired 200 rockets per day.
Historically, Hezbollah is not positioned in Lebanon to launch a war against Israel, but to help deter Israel, or give it pause, from attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. Indeed, Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal exists precisely to defend Iran and its most valuable nuclear assets by threatening to let loose against Israel should it ever target them.
“And now Iran is on the verge of becoming a nuclear threshold state, which is an unmitigated strategic disaster for Israel that could threaten its very existence,” according to Michael Makovsky, a former U.S. Defense Department official. “By playing it safe in Lebanon, Israel ended up in a worse situation on both fronts.”3
Years ago Israel could have launched a military campaign, not to destroy Hezbollah but to materially degrade its military capabilities. Israel would likely have needed to use ample ground forces and air power. It could have legitimized such an initiative upon enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which marked the end of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 prohibited “armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon” and called for “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that … there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.”
Those words — “the Lebanese State” and “the Government of Lebanon” — should have made it clear from the jump that an Israeli offensive campaign would be necessary not long after 2006. Instead, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (and the accompanying U.S. policy of strengthening Lebanese state institutions) “became a fig leaf for Iran to boost Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capability on Israel’s border,” according to Makovsky.
Hezbollah launched unprovoked attacks on Israel on October 8th, helping Hamas in its war. It continued them because it cannot be perceived as abandoning Hamas, thus placing Hezbollah in a quagmire.
This is a major development from when Hezbollah was its own terrorist organization and an Iranian proxy, the most senior one of any other proxy. But now, the others are growing. The Houthis have disrupted parts of the Red Sea, Iraqi militias are threatening U.S. troops and Israel, and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad still have not been defeated in Gaza. Hezbollah collaborates with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, but since October 8th, it has seen its independent choices curtailed and bookended by the Gaza war.
According to Israel’s Channel 13 news, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes that Israel is headed for an inevitable all-out confrontation with Hezbollah, since a diplomatic solution that could bring an end to the near-daily cross-border clashes with the Lebanese terror group remains elusive. Even then, Israeli officials doubt a diplomatic agreement will solve the current conflict and return the displaced northern residents home.
“Who will return home because Nasrallah will sign a paper?” security officials wondered. “How likely is it that will he agree to disarm? It is a dream, and it will not happen. That is why the defense establishment understands that we will probably have to go to war to bring the people home.”4
Make no mistake: The Israel-Hezbollah war has already begun. On Saturday, the IDF launched airstrikes deep in Lebanon, targeting what it said were Hezbollah weapons depots. Additional strikes destroying or at least degrading Hezbollah infrastructure have been customary for the last several months — including a daring operation last week all the way out in Syria.
Shaldag, one of the premier Israeli Air Force commando units, carried out a raid on Syrian soil in which a Hezbollah missile production facility built inside a mountain was destroyed. Independent experts, Israeli officials, and officials in the American administration described the facility as a center for research and development of weapons, which assists Iran. Chemical and biological weapons were being developed there, and potentially also nuclear weapons, as well as missiles used by Hezbollah.5
There was also the July assassination of Hezbollah’s shadowy number two, Fuad Shukr, at an apartment building in southern Beirut. Even a Hezbollah official admitted that Israel’s superior technological capabilities bested the terror group’s counter-surveillance system. A telephone call told Shukr to go up from his second-floor office to his seventh-floor residence, where he was easier to target with the Israeli drone that killed him.
All these operations are designed to dramatically downgrade Hezbollah’s capabilities, so that when the IDF officially announces an offensive against the terror group in Lebanon, it will be highly efficient and no less effective. Seemingly, it is no longer a question of if an all-out war with Hezbollah will take place, just a matter of when.
“Analysts: Hezbollah reluctant to fall into Israel’s all-out war trap in Lebanon.” United Press International.
“Israel’s Great Strategic Failure.” Tablet.
“Israel’s Great Strategic Failure.” Tablet.
“IDF ordered to prepare for military campaign in Lebanon: ‘Situation in north cannot continue; we must return residents home’.” Ynet News.
“הפשיטה של שלדג בסוריה, עדכון האמריקנים והמטרות: פרטים חדשים.” Ynet News.
The Israelis need to make it clear that Iran will be the primary target should such a war erupt
I agree that Hezbollah is next. I'm ~7000 miles away, but I do have the Red Alert app. I do that out of wanting a sense of how it must feel to be under constant rocket/drone alerts and knowing that every once in a while, one will get through. You all are in my prayers.
I also wonder about the total UN silence re 1701, and the rockets, but a megaphone attention given to "poor" Hamas. Where is the US pressure on Hezbollah to stop its terror campaign. The duplicity is amazing.