Israel just reminded the world who it is.
Yesterday’s rescue mission is an excellent demonstration that the IDF is performing much better than expected, including two massive deviations from the plan that occurred during the operation.
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On Saturday, four Israeli hostages were rescued alive from Hamas captivity during a daring daylight operation in the central Gaza Strip.
Officers of Israeli Police’s elite Yamam counter-terrorism unit, along with Shin Bet agents, simultaneously raided two Hamas-controlled multi-story buildings in the heart of central Gaza’s Nuseirat refugee camp. One of the hostages (Noa Argamani) was rescued at one site, while the three others at another location, 200 meters apart.
Hundreds more IDF soldiers participated in the operation.
According to a report out of Saudi Arabia, the undercover force also included women, and the fighters disguised themselves as Gazan families. The witnesses also claimed that when the residents of Nuseirat asked the fighters where they came from and what their purpose was in the refugee camp, they replied that they fled Rafah due to “severe airstrikes” and decided to rent a house in the market area.
The eyewitnesses said that at this point the fighters pointed to the building where Noa Argamani was being held. The Gazans also said that the force arrived in Nuseirat with a vehicle full of equipment characteristic of the displaced in the Strip, such as mattresses and clothes identical to those of the locals, so as not to arouse suspicion.
According to the report, the force split into two groups that went to the area of the “Al-Auda” medical center and to a house located 200 meters from the hospital. The witnesses said that the rescue of Argamani was relatively easy compared to that of the other three, and all operations were carried out under heavy cover of fire from the ground, sea, and air.
The operation started at 11 a.m. local time and reached its peak exactly one hour later, when the forces that arrived with an aid truck rescued the abductees while additional trucks in civilian “camouflage” covered the forces.
The eyewitnesses said that this seemed strange, but despite this, the forces managed to rescue the abductees from the two houses with the help of heavy fire and “bringing down buildings on their occupants.” The troops returned the same way they arrived, towards the northwest, and were evacuated with the help of helicopters that were waiting for them.
Yamam Chief Inspector Arnon Zmora, who commanded the rescue team at the building where three hostages were being held, was critically wounded by Hamas fire. He was brought to an Israeli hospital, but died shortly after. The Hamas guards were killed in the exchange.
Known originally as “Seeds of Summer,” the name of the rescue operation was changed after the event to “Operation Arnon” in his memory.
But what if the rescue attempt had failed? The fallout would have been ruinous for Israel. Completely. The Israelis would have further distanced themselves politically and diplomatically from even their greatest of friends.
Heck, even European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said after the successful rescue mission: “Reports from Gaza of another massacre of civilians are appalling. We condemn this in the strongest terms. The bloodbath must end immediately,” referring to the unverified high number of casualties claimed by Hamas officials in the operation.
A failed attempt would have made the calls for a ceasefire deafening, perhaps to a point where Israel would have to either significantly curtail its operations in Gaza, or suspend them altogether. And it would have emboldened Hamas in negotiations for the remaining hundred or so hostages, which in turn would have put their lives at even greater risk.
And yet, we can be sure that Israeli leadership would not have given a green light on the rescue attempt unless they were plenty certain of its impending success, which also comes with a massive risk: the escalation of a regional conflict, something the U.S. (Israel’s main backer) appears stubbornly against.
Despite the overwhelming hazards that both an unsuccessful and ultimately successful rescue attempt poses, Israel had no choice but to pursue it. And that is why it did.
After the Jewish state’s intelligence, military, and security establishments seemingly went on an off-the-grid vacation leading up to and during the October 7th terror attacks, Israel suddenly appeared to be what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called “as fragile as a spider web.”
All indications are that this utter Israeli failure was at least in part produced by the internal, boiling-over division produced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extreme Right-wing government and their efforts at hurried, steadfast judicial reform.
Israel did not seem like the mighty country it built itself into being in one of the most dangerous regions of the world. And Hamas, whose genocidal ambitions many Israelis (including myself) have overconfidently mocked for years, abruptly became an existential threat. As one Israeli politician, Yoav Kisch of Netanyahu’s Likud party, aptly put it: “We were busy with nonsense. We forgot where we live.”
Historically, Israelis are confident, but still vigilant. It is why they have been able to pull off some of the craziest operations the world has seen, including the raid on Entebbe — the 1976 rescue operation by Israeli commandos to release more than 100 Jewish hostages after their plane was hijacked by Palestinian and German terrorists.
There was also Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm that caused substantial damage to Iran’s nuclear program. “The attackers took great care to make sure that only their designated targets were hit. It was a marksman’s job,” three New York Times journalists wrote.1
And, of course, the Iron Dome, the world’s greatest mobile, all-weather missile defense system ever built. The system shoots down some 90 percent of enemy rockets that would otherwise land in populated civilian areas.
Israeli dominance is thus a combination of fundamentally understanding its enemies, superior technology, a wide talent pool (since conscription is mandatory), and bold creative endeavors.
But the Israel that we woke up to on October 7th did not demonstrate any semblances of this combination. It was exorbitantly surprised, lethally slow, mentally paralyzed, socially divided, and politically handicapped.
On Saturday, however, much of this depressing reality changed after news broke during the early afternoon of the successful rescue attempt. A lifeguard at the beach in Tel Aviv made an announcement on the loudspeaker, and those present erupted in applause and cheers. In Athens, Greece, dozens of Israelis were seen in footage on the streets celebrating the news, and chanting: “Am Israel Chai.”
It gave Israelis and our supporters a sense that, even though the war in Gaza is still very much ongoing, and it will for many more months as Israeli officials continue to remind us. And even if Hamas, while battered, is far from demolished, Israel remains powerful.
The war’s progress, and the question of who should govern Gaza after it, remain fuzzy at best, but the hostage rescue mission painted an uncomplicated picture: The IDF and Israel’s defense establishment have been working well since October 7th. The cooperation between the Air Force and the Ground Forces. The intimate interface between the Shin Bet and the IDF. The precise intelligence.
The failures are still there, reported extensively when they are exposed, but the functioning and performance of the IDF in Gaza is much better than predicted. Yesterday’s cautionary action is an excellent demonstration, including the two massive deviations from the plan that occurred during the operation.
The first is the severe injury and death of Yamam Chief Inspector Arnon Zmora, the hero who was a team leader in the raiding forces. An unexpected delay immediately ensued. In a place like Nuseirat camp, every minute like this is worth more gunmen. And more than one terrorist started pouring into the place, with an RPG, and later armed with Kalashnikov rifles.
The Israeli Air Force had to provide fire in close proximity to the force, to make sure it could get out; this is part of the reason for the many Palestinian casualties.
The second mishap was when Hamas fired at an Israeli rescue truck, with the troops and three of the four abductees inside. One of the bullets apparently hit the transmission, and the truck was disabled, stuck in Nuseirat. This could have been a critical point of failure. At least two operational alternatives were prepared for such a situation. One of them was activated; finally, the forces and three abductees were rescued from the scene. But if this plan failed, another was prepared.
It was easy to detect the complete panic in Hamas’ channels. They lost their minds in frustration and accused the Israelis that the U.S. carried out the operation for them, that it used the recently American-made sea port, and that 18 Israeli soldiers were killed in the operation. More and more lies. Of course, the number of dead Palestinians in Nuseirat grew hour by hour.
“In great moments of defeat, the Palestinians return to the mentality of 1967,” an officer who was involved in the operation noted with satisfaction. “One should worry when they speak the truth.”2
As for the Israelis, it seems that we remembered that we cannot be powerful if we are fearful. And we will have to be even more powerful, even more daring, and even more creative to win this war.
“Israel Tests on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay.” New York Times.
“ישׁ שָׁעָה רוֹחֶשֶׁת חֹשֶׁךְ, אַךְ יֵשׁ שַׁחַר וְהִילָּה.” Ynet News.
Very good news to hear. God Bless the IDF and Israeli intelligence.
The best news ever. And now, let's get the rest of the hostages.