The Internal War Over America’s Iran Strategy
President Trump’s approach to Iran exposes competing factions within the Republican Party, and how the Democrats might manipulate it. The topic of U.S. support for Israel is sure to follow suit.
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This is a guest essay by Vanessa Berg, who writes about Judaism and Israel.
You can also listen to the podcast version of this essay on Apple Podcasts, YouTube Music, YouTube, and Spotify.
Part of what makes Israeli politics so messy is the sheer number of political parties.
The Jewish state has a highly fragmented, multi-party system with dozens of registered parties, though usually only 10 to 15 pass the 3.25 percent threshold to secure seats in the 120-member Knesset (parliament). While dozens might run in any given election (for example, 39 in 2022, 31 in 2019, 34 in 2013), they often form alliances, with the major ideological blocs being Right-wing, centrist, Left-wing, and Arab parties.
American politics appears the opposite, but is actually quite similar.
On the surface the United States is a two-party system: Democrats versus Republicans. In reality, these labels obscure the multiplicity of factions, ideologies, and competing power centers that operate within each party. This internal complexity often dictates policy far more than the broad partisan identities the public is asked to believe in.
The current U.S. approach to the war with Iran demonstrates this truth in stark relief.
For more than three weeks, the U.S. has been engaged in a conflict with Iran that has, by most conventional measures, gone overwhelmingly in America’s favor. Yet now, the administration is signaling a willingness to negotiate, with a “peace summit” reportedly under consideration in Pakistan.
Pakistani sources said U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance was being put forward as a probable chief negotiator from the U.S. side if talks go ahead. Vance was not involved in the nuclear negotiations with Iran before the war; President Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, and son-in-law Jared Kushner were.
The involvement of Vance in these potential negotiations reveals the internal calculations at play within the Republican Party. Before the war began, Vance was publicly skeptical of U.S. military engagement abroad. At a 2024 Michigan rally, he declared: “We gotta stop sending our young people to faraway lands. We are not the policemen of the world.” On a podcast weeks later, he described potential conflict with Iran as “a huge distraction of resources” and “massively expensive.”
White House insiders now confirm that Vance opposed the Iran operation during pre-war deliberations, concerned about its success and cost. Trump attempted to downplay the divide, telling reporters several days ago that he and Vance were “philosophically, a little bit different” in their initial viewpoints on the Iran war. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, by contrast, remains fully aligned with Trump on Iran, highlighting the factional tensions at the very top of the Republican Party.
This scenario illustrates the core fallacy of American politics: that elections are contests between two monolithic parties. In reality, the Republican Party itself is a coalition of factions — Trump loyalists (known as MAGA), traditional conservatives, libertarians, anti-interventionists like Vance, and establishment pragmatists like Rubio.
Policy decisions are often negotiated among these internal actors rather than imposed by a unified party ideology. What appears to the public as sudden shifts or reversals, such as the move toward diplomacy with Iran after three weeks of all-out war, is often the result of compromise or competition among these factions.
The war timeline itself shows how factional influence shapes outcomes: Vance’s opposition may have slowed or reshaped the initial operation, while the Trump-Rubio alignment pushed the conflict forward. The pivot toward negotiations now may reflect Vance’s influence asserting itself, even amid victory, a signal that internal politics often outweigh simple military calculus.
There are many reasons why Vance and his allies are finding themselves on the defensive. During the last presidential election, Vance positioned himself as strongly anti-war, a stance that resonated with voters weary of foreign conflicts. But that same position could be turned against him if he chooses to run for president in 2028, especially in a political climate where national security and military engagement are increasingly front-of-mind issues. Opponents could portray him as a hypocrite or outright liar.
The immediate political landscape adds more pressure. This November, Americans will head to the polls for midterm elections, deciding all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 Senate seats for the 120th Congress, along with 39 gubernatorial races, attorney general elections, and numerous state and local contests. Voters are already concerned about the economy, and the rise in energy prices since the outbreak of war has intensified those worries.
House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson, perhaps feeling the pressure of November’s elections, has also contradicted Trump during the last few weeks, saying the U.S. should not be “nation-building” or intervening around the world, casting a stark contrast to Trump’s recent framing of the international war he had hoped would be an opportunity for “building a new country” in Iran. He also stated this week that the war is “all but done” and expected to conclude quickly, asserting that original objectives have been largely met, whereas it was reported in Israeli media that U.S. officials told Israel to prepare for more weeks of war.
The Democratic Party, too, is far from uniform. It contains “progressives” advocating for aggressive climate and social justice policies, moderates focused on economic pragmatism, pro-business centrists, foreign policy hawks, anti-war liberals, and identity-focused activists.
These divides were reflected in the vote for a nonbinding resolution in the House of Representatives three weeks ago that reaffirmed Iran as the “largest state sponsor of terrorism.” The resolution said the Islamic Republic of Iran “remains the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism and provides substantial financial and military support to groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.” But 53 House Democrats voted against this resolution, including some of the party’s most vicious anti-Israel voices — notably Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida Tlaib.
Indeed, U.S. support for Israel has become one of the most contested issues within the Democratic Party.
Historically, Democrats were overwhelmingly pro-Israel, driven by sympathy for the Jews after the Holocaust and strategic considerations during the Cold War. President Harry Truman’s immediate recognition of the modern State of Israel in 1948 set a tone of bipartisan support that carried through the 1960s, with the party largely aligned on Israel’s security and survival. After Israel’s surprising victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, the U.S. began more formally and closely working with the Israelis.
Israel was seen as a reliable ally, and criticism of its policies was largely confined to foreign policy circles rather than the party base. However, starting in the 2010s, under then-U.S. President Barack Obama, more “progressive” Democrats began openly challenging Israel’s actions, advocating for conditional U.S. aid.
Obama’s Iran policy, centered on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (better known as the Iranian nuclear deal), was one of the most controversial foreign policy decisions in modern American politics, and its impact on the Democratic Party has been long-lasting. At its core, Obama made a deliberate strategic bet: Diplomacy, not confrontation, was the best way to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
But the reality played out very differently. First, it legitimized Iran’s regime, failed to address its regional aggression, and empowered a hostile power with billions in economic relief. Even at the time, the deal was described as one of the most controversial diplomatic agreements in U.S. history, with Congress and the public deeply divided. Obama framed the choice starkly as deal or war, a characterization that oversimplified the risks.
Where Democrats had once broadly supported intervention when necessary and maintained strong alignment with allies like Israel, the deal helped open the door to a growing faction of “progressives.” The debate became a proxy for a broader ideological struggle between establishment Democrats who emphasized deterrence and alliances, and a rising “progressive” wing that is overly critical of Israel as a Jewish state and increasingly questions American aid for Jerusalem.
But here’s where things get interesting: Last month, an internal investigation within the Democratic Party found that former U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris’ stance on Gaza and Israel’s war against Hamas cost her votes in the 2024 presidential election — meaning she was not pro-Israel enough.1 It is well-known by now that many historically Democratic American Jews jumped ship to vote Republican in the last presidential election, or simply did not vote at all.
At the same time, many of the prospects for candidates likely to become the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate in 2028 are “progressive.” One of them is California Governor Gavin Newsom, who recently said people were “talking about [Israel] appropriately as sort of an apartheid state.” (He apologized for that remark this week, with a caveat of course.)
What’s more, many in the Democratic Party have distanced themselves in the last few months from the Israeli government and allied groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Some progressives and members of Congress have described Israel’s campaign in Gaza as “genocide” and are supporting restrictions on arms sales. Recent polling data showed 57 percent of Democrats hold a negative view of Israel, up from 35 percent after October 7, 2023; 62 percent of Democrats feel the U.S. is “too supportive” of Israel; and Democrats now sympathize with Palestinians over Israelis by a 50-percent margin.2
There are, of course, many Democratic Party politicians and voters who still fundamentally support Israel, including quite a few American Jews. Yet the public discourse rarely acknowledges these nuances. Politicians and voters are now asked to choose between being “pro-Israel” and “anti-Israel,” just as Democrats are painted as “liberal” and Republicans as “conservative,” obscuring the internal struggles that actually drive policy outcomes.
Recognizing these factions is crucial for understanding American policies. Policy volatility is not simply a function of new presidents or public opinion; it is a reflection of shifting influence among competing internal factions. Allies and adversaries alike observe these divisions and adjust their calculations accordingly.
One of those adversaries, Iran, probably sees what is becoming increasingly obvious: the crack in America’s Iran strategy, driven by strong differences of opinion between Trump and Vance. According to a report on Wednesday, Iranian sources have said they would refuse to sit down with Witkoff or Kushner.3
In recent days there have also been not-so-subtle attacks on Mossad Director David Barnea by nameless sources, accusing him of misleading both the Israeli and U.S. governments about the likelihood of regime change in Iran. The gist of the report is that Barnea convinced Netanyahu who convinced Trump that the Iranian regime could be toppled by the Mossad and CIA within a short time following the outbreak of the war. Some have speculated in Israeli media that U.S. officials are looking for a fall-guy if they cannot sell this military operation as a success to the American people.
Meanwhile, Democrats are watching closely for political openings. If the conflict becomes unpopular, or even just politically ambiguous, they are likely to argue that the current U.S.-Israel relationship is entangling America in costly and unnecessary foreign conflicts. Should that line of attack gain traction in the upcoming midterm elections, it will almost certainly be sharpened and amplified heading into 2028.
And as Israel becomes more central to partisan debate, the downstream effects may be significant. For American Jews, whose sense of security and social standing has already been shaken since October 7th, the growing politicization of Israel risks pulling their identity into the center of an increasingly polarized and volatile national conversation.
There are also profound ramifications for Israel itself. If the Iranian regime survives this war intact, it will fundamentally reshape how other countries calculate risk when it comes to confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many regional and global actors are already wary of escalation, given how quickly this conflict has disrupted energy markets, global trade routes, and regional stability.
A scenario in which the Iranian regime absorbs significant blows yet remains in power would lead many people to jump to the conclusion that even sustained military pressure may not be enough to decisively weaken the regime. That, in turn, is likely to make future coalitions far harder to assemble for Israel, as allies become more cautious about entering a conflict with uncertain endgames and high economic and political costs.
Just as importantly, it could dampen appetite for direct confrontation across the Middle East. Many states already balance quiet alignment with Israel against fears of wider war and regional blowback, and a resilient Iranian regime would only deepen that hesitation. Even countries that share Israel’s concerns about Tehran may prefer containment, deterrence, or backchannel diplomacy over open conflict.
The result would be a more constrained strategic environment for Israel — one in which it may increasingly find itself acting alone or with limited backing in future confrontations, while Iran retains both its regime and its ability to project influence across the region.
And yet, constraints can also force clarity. A more cautious region does not necessarily mean a weaker Israel; it can mean a more strategically disciplined one. Israel has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to adapt, innovate, and recalibrate under pressure, turning complex threats into opportunities to strengthen deterrence and deepen selective partnerships.
If anything, this moment may push Israel to develop more sustainable, long-term strategies — combining military strength with diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and regional alignment. In that sense, even an imperfect outcome could lay the groundwork for a more stable and strategically coherent Middle East, where strength is measured not just by victories in war, but by the ability to shape what comes after.
“Scoop: Dems working on secret report found Gaza cost Harris votes.” Axios.
“Poll: Israel’s standing plummets among Democrats, fueling primaries on the left.” NBC News.
“JD Vance role touted as Pakistan attempts to broker US-Iran peace talks.” The Guardian.
If israel disappeared tomorrow, who would mourn and who would cheer?
I think the comparison between American politics and Israeli politics is overstated. Israel has a fragmented multi-party system where small parties built around single issues can hold disproportionate power. The United States simply doesn’t operate that way. Despite internal disagreements, the two major parties still have clear core agendas that voters broadly understand.
As for Trump and the Iran war, there’s also a key point missing. Trump did campaign on avoiding endless wars, but he also repeatedly promised that Iran would never be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons. What we’ve seen is him trying to honor both commitments. He delayed repeatedly, giving Iran additional time and opportunities to change course before acting.
Once Iran continued its aggression, the decision to strike its missile and nuclear infrastructure followed directly from that promise.
Some differences of opinion inside a party are normal — every coalition has them. But the idea that this represents a deep or destabilizing fracture seems exaggerated. Polling among MAGA voters, for example, shows overwhelming support for Trump’s approach.
In short, this looks less like a party in crisis and more like a president carrying out one of the central commitments of his campaign.