The Next 500 Days
As the war between Israel and Hamas hits its 500th day today, the question shifts from the present battlefield to the future: What will the next 500 days look like?
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As the war between Israel and Hamas hits its 500th day today, the question shifts from the present battlefield to the future: What will the next 500 days look like?
Will Israel secure long-term security? Will Gaza be free of Hamas? Will regional stability improve or deteriorate?
From Israel’s perspective, understanding these scenarios is critical to ensuring the Jewish state’s safety, sovereignty, and long-term survival in an increasingly hostile international environment.
Scenario 1: Total Hamas Defeat and Demilitarization of Gaza
Best-Case Outcome for Israel
In this scenario, Israel successfully dismantles Hamas’s military and political infrastructure, preventing it from ever regaining power in Gaza. This would require:
Eliminating Hamas leadership and military capabilities from Gaza
Preventing rearmament by controlling smuggling routes from Iran, Hezbollah, and others
Securing international or regional cooperation (chiefly, with Saudi Arabia) to maintain stability
While difficult, this outcome is essential for ensuring that Hamas — an organization openly committed to Israel’s destruction — can never again carry out attacks like those of October 7th. However, it would also require a long-term governance plan for post-war Gaza, which remains one of Israel’s biggest challenges.
A significant development influencing this scenario is President Donald Trump's recent proposal regarding the future of Gaza. This month, Trump suggested that the United States take control of the Gaza Strip, relocate its over two million Palestinian residents to neighboring countries such as Egypt and Jordan, and redevelop the area into a prosperous region, potentially transforming it into the "Riviera of the Middle East."
This plan has received support from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who described it as "the only viable plan to enable a different future" for Gaza, Israel, and the region.
However, the proposal has faced significant opposition from various quarters. Neighboring Arab nations, including Egypt and Jordan, have rejected the idea of resettling Palestinian populations within their borders, citing concerns over regional stability and the rights of the Palestinian people.
What they really mean is that they do not to take in large swaths of Gazans because doing so would destabilize the sociopolitical landscapes in their countries and could very well be political suicide for these regimes. See: Palestinians in Jordan in 1970, Palestinians in Lebanon in the mid-1970s, and Palestinians in Kuwait in the early 1990s.
International bodies and human rights organizations have also criticized Trump’s plan, labeling it as a form of ethnic cleansing and a violation of international law, both of which are complete nonsense. What these organizations really mean is that many of their employees and contractors would be out of jobs should they stop manufacturing the Palestinians as forever-and-ever refugees.
Scenario 2: A weak Hamas survives, and Gaza remains a stalemate.
A Risky but Manageable Outcome for Israel
Despite Israel’s military superiority, Hamas may survive in a weakened state, maintaining some level of control over Gaza while Israel continues counterterrorism operations. In this case:
Hamas retains some influence, but its military capabilities are significantly reduced.
Israel continues periodic strikes to prevent Hamas from rearming.
A fragile and unstable security situation persists, with sporadic rocket attacks and Israeli responses.
This is the status quo Israel has dealt with since 2007, but after October 7th, it is unacceptable to many Israelis. While this outcome might be seen as a short-term necessity, it leaves Hamas with the ability to regroup, likely setting the stage for future conflicts.
At the same time, Israel would not make the same mistake that it made leading up to October 7th, when it ignored sign after sign of an imminent attack emanating out of Gaza.
In this scenario, despite Israel's extensive military operations, Hamas retains a diminished yet operational presence in Gaza. The group’s infrastructure and capabilities are significantly degraded, leading to sporadic rocket attacks and localized skirmishes. Israel continues targeted counterterrorism measures to prevent Hamas from regaining strength, resulting in a protracted but controlled conflict.
Complicating this situation is the broader regional tension, particularly concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Recent intelligence assessments suggest that Israel is contemplating preemptive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities to curb potential threats.
Reports indicate that Israeli leaders, perceiving a narrowing window of opportunity, are considering significant military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This potential escalation aims to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in Iran’s defenses and to prevent the development of nuclear weapons capabilities.
I mention this here because geopolitics is a game of give and take. Perhaps the Israelis would agree to end the war in Gaza if it means they receive the international green light to go after Iran.
Scenario 3: An International ‘Solution’ That Undermines Israeli Security
A Diplomatic Trap Israel Must Avoid
There are growing international calls for a “two-state solution” revival or a United Nations-administered Gaza following the war. While these may sound appealing to Western policymakers, they pose serious risks for Israel:
A rushed political solution that empowers Hamas or similar groups in the name of “Palestinian representation”
International pressure to accept a Palestinian Authority presence in Gaza, despite its history of corruption and weakness
Restrictions on Israeli military operations, making future counterterrorism efforts more difficult
Israel must resist external pressure to accept a premature diplomatic solution that does not ensure complete security. Any political arrangement in Gaza must prioritize Israel’s right to self-defense and security control.
Scenario 4: Israel implements long-term security control over Gaza.
A Complex but Necessary Strategic Shift
Given the failure of past disengagement policies, Israel may be forced to establish a long-term security presence in Gaza to prevent future attacks. This would involve:
A continued Israeli military presence to ensure Hamas and other terror groups do not reemerge
Control over border crossings and arms smuggling routes
The potential for local governance models that do not rely on Hamas or the Palestinian Authority
This scenario is highly controversial internationally, but may be the only way to ensure Israel’s security. While direct control of Gaza would be costly and politically challenging, it would eliminate the ability of terrorist groups to rebuild.
Scenario 5: A Regional Shift Toward Israeli-Arab Cooperation
A Game-Changer for Israel’s Future
One of the most promising long-term scenarios is a shift in regional dynamics, where Israel strengthens ties with pragmatic Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In this case:
Arab states play a role in stabilizing post-war Gaza, reducing Iranian influence.
Normalization efforts with Saudi Arabia accelerate, increasing regional security cooperation.
A new framework emerges where moderate Palestinian factions — if they exist — can be empowered over Hamas.
If this scenario materializes, Israel could achieve both security and diplomatic victories. However, much depends on how Israel manages the conflict in the coming months and whether Arab states are willing to engage in a post-Hamas Gaza.
For now, Iranian destabilization is alive and kicking in the volatile Middle East. In 2011, Iranian-funded and -equipped extremists tried to mobilize the Shia Muslim community in Bahrain to overthrow the Sunni king and his political establishment. Iran has also filled the void that the UK and its allies created with the second invasion of Iraq, and now uses its connections across the border with the Shia community to try to control this country.
In addition, Iran propped up Syria’s now-former President Bashar al-Assad and sent large numbers of soldiers and military equipment in support of his brutal regime, which also helps the Iranians gain easier access to Lebanon, where it funds Hezbollah, on the border with Israel, to fire rockets at the Jewish state and wait for an opportunity to attack, perhaps like Hamas did on October 7th.
In Yemen, the Iranians supply the Houthi rebels with intelligence, financial backing, and weapons, which have been fired at Saudi Arabia on many occasions; and its war with the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen against the Houthis has led to a bloody civil war.
When you look at a map of these Iranian-backed countries and territories, they all surround Saudi Arabia and Israel. Therefore it seems beyond a reasonable doubt that Iran’s long-term strategy is to maintain a “noose” around the Saudis and Israelis, which the Iranians can tighten whenever they see fit.
Now, as the Middle East has broken out into mini wars between the Iranian “Axis of Resistance” and its adversaries, the last thing Iran wants is to appear weak in the eyes of Israel, the U.S. and its Arab allies, as well as domestic enemies of the Ayatollah’s regime.
Though it has been bragging about hitting Israeli targets and Sunni terrorists in recent months, Iran’s response shows unquestionable shortcomings. Israel has continued to assassinate senior members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and established air superiority across Lebanon, Syria, and Iran — while the Iranians are striking fictitious Israeli targets far away from the Jewish state, such as “one of the main Mossad espionage headquarters” in Iraqi Kurdistan, an assertion that was promptly dismissed by Iraq.
This displays the limits of Iran’s power, and with nuclear-armed Pakistan hitting back inside Iranian territory, Tehran looks even less imposing.
However, the Iranian octopus has succeeded in one important avenue since October 7th: Tehran wants the U.S. and Europe to pressure Israel to prematurely curtail its war on Hamas, and is using the threat of regional escalation to achieve this aim.
As the U.S. repeatedly declares that it does not want to escalate against Iran, escalation and regional conflict are exactly what Iran is trying to deliver, largely through its proxies: Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria.
Tehran is betting that, if it can convince Washington and the European Union to stop supporting Israel because it risks igniting a broader blaze, Iran can force the U.S. and Europe to demand that Israel either ends its fight against Hamas and Hezbollah, or at least end American and European support for it.
Though there are also domestic reasons for growing pressure in the U.S. and across Europe to wind down Israel’s war against Hamas, anxieties that the U.S. and Europe could be drawn into a regional war have weighed heavily on American and European decision-makers.
But if the U.S. and Europe finally decide to hold Iran accountable for exponentially destabilizing the Middle East, they will find plenty of willing partners. The responses to Iranian attacks demonstrate that a regional coalition can be quickly created to put the Islamic Republic in its place. The Saudis want it, the Emiratis want it, the Bahrainis want it — and, of course, the Israelis want it.
Another great post Joshua. Thank you for breaking it down for us.
Hi Joshua, you only alluded to but do not specifically mention the Philadelphi corridor. It is the key to controlling Gaza. The Israeli’s cannot give it up. I also think a very large percentage of Gazans would leave if given a chance. Egypt should be forced to open its border to them. It should have done so years ago.