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This is a guest essay by Hen Mazzig, an Israeli writer, speaker, and social media influencer.
You can also listen to the podcast version of this essay on Apple Podcasts, YouTube Music, YouTube, and Spotify.
Shortly after midnight on Thursday, November 12th, an Israeli airstrike hit Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis, in southern Gaza.
Gaza health officials said six people were killed. One of them was a surgeon, Dr. Rezik Abushira, and another was a 13-year-old boy. The Israeli military said its target was Muhammad Abu Ismail, the commander of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade, who had turned a floor of the hospital into a headquarters.
A doctor and a child are dead, and no description of the target changes that fact. I am starting there because I am about to tell you something else about that hospital, and I don’t want you to read what follows as an excuse for their deaths.
For three years, Palestinians in Khan Younis have been saying that Hamas brings its Palestinian prisoners to Nasser Hospital. In June, a United Nations human rights commission documented 249 cases of extrajudicial punishment in Gaza between August 2024 and January 2026, and 108 of those cases ended in death. The commission described “executions, kneecapping, bone-breaking with metal pipes or cement bricks and beatings.”
Hamas operatives and police were tied to nearly a quarter of the cases, while other armed groups accounted for more. Witnesses told the commission that some of the punishments were carried out in hospital compounds, specifically naming Nasser. Earlier this year, Doctors Without Borders suspended its non-critical work at the hospital after its teams saw masked, armed men arresting patients.
A Palestinian could enter Nasser Hospital seeking medical treatment while another Palestinian was being interrogated, beaten, or imprisoned somewhere in the same compound. The very institution meant to protect people’s lives was also being used, according to these accounts, to punish those who had fallen afoul of Hamas.
Hamza al-Masri, a journalist from Gaza with more than a million Facebook followers, has been reporting on Hamas’ violence against other Palestinians. Speaking to the Saudi television channel Al Arabiya, he described what he says happened near the hospital:
“Hamas executed 22 young men without trial inside a bus that it claimed belonged to armed militias. This happened near Nasser Hospital, and whoever survived was executed inside the hospital.”
Al-Masri’s account is horrifying, not only because of the brutality it describes, but because the alleged victims were Palestinians killed by other Palestinians. There was no Israeli airstrike involved in the executions he described, no Israeli soldier pulling the trigger, and no way to fit their deaths into the familiar narrative of Palestinian suffering at Israel’s hands.
So the building Israel bombed last week was a working hospital with surgeons and child patients, but it was also where Hamas interrogated and killed Palestinians. Both descriptions are true, and acknowledging one should not require ignoring the other. Yet most of the coverage I read mentioned only the first.
To understand why Hamas needs an interrogation site at all, we have to go back to the 1980s, long before Hamas governed Gaza. A young man from Khan Younis named Yahya Sinwar helped build a unit called al-Majd. Its job was to hunt Palestinians suspected of working with Israel. Israel arrested Sinwar in 1988 for murdering Palestinians he accused of collaboration. Thirty-five years later, he planned the October 7th massacre.
That history reveals something fundamental about Hamas. Its willingness to use violence against Palestinians did not begin with the current war, nor was it simply a consequence of the pressures of governing Gaza. From its early years, Hamas regarded Palestinians suspected of disloyalty as enemies who needed to be identified and punished.
After Hamas took Gaza by force in 2007, al-Majd grew into the Internal Security apparatus, effectively a full-fledged secret police force. It planted informers in rival factions, monitored potential opponents, and punished anyone who criticized Hamas in public. The objective was not merely to prevent collaboration with Israel. It was to make sure that no Palestinian could seriously challenge Hamas’ authority.
One of the most effective tools in this system was the accusation of being an Israeli collaborator. In Gaza, that accusation can amount to a death sentence, and Hamas decides whom it wants to brand as such.
Hamza Al-Masri described to Al Arabiya how the system handles a family that complains about the treatment of a relative: “If a family sits quietly, we don’t talk; but if they speak up, then your son is an Israeli agent.”
In other words, a family that demands an explanation for what happened to its son risks having him branded a traitor. The accusation itself becomes a weapon, and the threat extends beyond the person initially targeted to anyone who might question his treatment.
This is how intimidation becomes an instrument of government. Hamas does not need to arrest every Palestinian who disagrees with it. It needs enough people to understand what can happen when someone speaks out.
Three years of war have killed many of the men who ran that apparatus, so Hamas has rebuilt it, albeit in cruder form. Two units now carry out much of this work in Gaza’s streets: Sahm, meaning Arrow, and Rada, meaning Deterrence.
Their members wear masks. They shoot people in the legs, break bones with pipes, and film the attacks. The violence is brutal enough, but the decision to record and distribute it serves another purpose. Hamas wants other Palestinians to see what happens to people who challenge its authority.
On October 13, 2025, just three days after the ceasefire with Israel took effect, masked gunmen dragged a group of men into a square in Gaza City and shot them in front of a crowd. Sahm shared the footage itself. The UN commission found that Hamas intentionally publicized these attacks to frighten everyone watching.
After three years of devastating war, with Gaza’s population struggling to recover, Hamas was publicly executing Palestinians within days of the ceasefire. Rather than concealing the violence, it wanted people to witness it. The message was unmistakable: Hamas was still in charge, and anyone who challenged that reality could pay for it with his life.
But some of the Gazans whom Hamas is trying to frighten have started shooting back. Five main armed groups now operate against Hamas, with at most a few thousand members between them. They are based primarily in the parts of Gaza that the Israeli army still holds, east of the Yellow Line, the boundary Israeli forces withdrew to under the October 2025 ceasefire.
The largest is the Popular Forces in Rafah. Its founder, Yasser Abu Shabab, was killed last December by Hamas, and his deputy, Ghassan al-Duhayni, now leads the organization. In Khan Younis, a former Palestinian Authority security officer named Hussam al-Astal runs a group called the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force. Another former Palestinian Authority officer, Shawqi Abu Nasira, commands the Free Homeland Forces in central Gaza.
These men raid Hamas positions and film their own operations. In a sense, Hamas’ methods have taught its opponents something about the importance of public perception. When armed men spend years demonstrating their power through videos of intimidation and violence, those challenging them understand that they, too, must show Palestinians that Hamas is not invincible.
Al-Duhayni has taken to taunting Hamas on camera, saying: “Let’s see what you’ve got, Hamas.”
At the start of September, Israel’s Shin Bet (its internal security and counterintelligence service) captured Mu’in al-Arabid, the head of Hamas’ internal security apparatus, in a daytime raid in Gaza City. Israel’s official statements credited its own forces, but Arabic media and later the Jerusalem Post reported that Palestinian militants had participated. Al-Araby TV said the fighters belonged to al-Duhayni.
These developments suggest that Hamas faces an enemy it has spent decades trying to suppress: Palestinians who have decided that their own future requires challenging the organization that governs them.
But it would be a mistake to exaggerate the militias’ strength or their prospects. Israel tried to build a friendly local leadership in the West Bank in the late 1970s through an initiative called the Village Leagues. The project fell apart before the first intifada. Israel also armed the South Lebanon Army for two decades, only to watch it collapse within days when Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2000.
These precedents are reminders that an armed group supported by Israel does not necessarily possess the legitimacy, organization, or popular support required to survive without that protection.
Michael Milshtein of Tel Aviv University, one of Israel’s most respected analysts of Palestinian politics, wrote in August that Gaza’s anti-Hamas militias were isolated and close to collapse. Their military capabilities are limited, and there is no guarantee that they can translate their opposition to Hamas into a viable political alternative. Still, their weaknesses should not obscure the significance of what they are doing.
For years, Hamas has claimed to represent the Palestinian people while brutally punishing Palestinians who disagree with it. Now there are Palestinians willing to challenge that claim openly, despite knowing what the consequences might be.
Their motives may be complicated, and nobody should assume that every militia leader is interested in democracy or peaceful coexistence. But the fact that Palestinians themselves are fighting Hamas deserves more attention than it receives.
Hussam al-Astal has made his position particularly clear. He told an interviewer that there are people in Gaza today “capable of signing a stable peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians so that both peoples can live in peace.”
You can doubt his motives and his backers. You can question whether his organization has any meaningful future or whether its members are capable of providing better leadership than Hamas. Those are legitimate questions. But he is still a Palestinian in Gaza publicly advocating a future in which Israelis and Palestinians can live in peace, knowing that Hamas considers such opposition a threat.
At the very least, that should make him worthy of attention from people who claim to care about Palestinian freedom.
For three years, the streets of London, New York, and other Western cities have been filled with people who say they stand with Palestinians. They have organized enormous marches, occupied university buildings, disrupted public events, and demanded action from their governments. They have developed an extensive vocabulary for Palestinian suffering, particularly when Palestinians are killed by Israel.
I have watched those marches closely. I have never seen a sign for the men shot in that square in Gaza City, or heard a chant for the Palestinians the UN says were beaten with cement bricks. I have not seen demonstrators demanding that Hamas stop imprisoning Palestinians inside hospitals or executing people accused of collaborating with Israel.
The movement has a full vocabulary for Palestinians killed by Israel, and almost no words at all for Palestinians killed by Hamas. That is an extraordinary omission for a movement that claims to be concerned with Palestinian lives and Palestinian freedom.
After all, a Palestinian executed by Hamas is no less Palestinian than one killed in an Israeli airstrike. A Palestinian whose legs are broken for criticizing Hamas is no less deserving of freedom than one living under Israeli military control. Yet the suffering of the former seems to generate remarkably little outrage among the people who are most vocal about the latter.
The consequences of that silence are not abstract. They extend directly into the negotiations over Gaza’s future, where the question of who retains weapons and who exercises authority could determine whether Palestinians who oppose Hamas survive.
Michael Milshtein reported in August that Hamas had won a clause in the current negotiating framework requiring the anti-Hamas militias to be disarmed and their members barred from any future Gaza security force. A Palestinian source told him that Jared Kushner had shown “full understanding” of the demand. Hamas itself has still not disarmed.
The Palestinians who took up arms against Hamas would be required to surrender their weapons and excluded from Gaza’s future security institutions, while the masked men of Sahm and Rada could retain theirs. The people who have been shooting Palestinians in the legs, breaking their bones, and executing them in public would remain armed, while those who dared to resist them would be left defenseless.
And given what Hamas has already demonstrated it is willing to do to its opponents, the potential consequences are not difficult to imagine.
Abu Nasira understands this better than most. Speaking to the pan-Arab outlet Jusoor News, he declared: “Even if they execute my entire family, from oldest to youngest, I will not back down from my decisions and my actions.” He has also said that Hamas raided his home and arrested his wife.
Imagine being a Palestinian who has spent years watching Hamas punish its critics and intimidate their families, finally deciding to resist, only to discover that an international negotiating process might leave you exposed to precisely the people you challenged.
This is why the question of Gaza’s future cannot simply be reduced to whether Israel withdraws or whether a ceasefire holds. It must also involve what happens to Palestinians who do not want Hamas to govern them.
I don’t know whether these militias will survive, and nobody has to cheer for them. Their leaders may have questionable motives, their organizations may be weak, and their prospects may be bleak.
But a movement that genuinely wants Palestinians to be free should at least be able to acknowledge that Palestinians themselves are resisting Hamas. It should be able to condemn the torture and execution of Palestinians without first asking whether Israel was responsible.
And it should be able to recognize that Palestinian freedom must mean more than freedom from Israel. Surely it must also include the freedom to criticize Hamas, to oppose its rule, and to advocate a different future without being branded a collaborator and sentenced to death.
I would like to hear New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani say the words Sahm and Rada once. I would like to hear him speak about Palestinians tortured and executed by Hamas with the same conviction he brings to his criticism of Israel. I would like to see one sign at one march for the men executed in that square in Gaza City, or one demonstration demanding that Hamas stop terrorizing the Palestinians it claims to represent.
For a movement that says it stands for Palestinian liberation, that should not be too much to ask.




There is tremendous overlap between those in the streets of America who oppose ICE and those who have made clear their support for hamas. Yes there hsve been abuses by ICE agents. But it is crystal clear that ICE are choir boys compared to the heroes of Oct 7. These protesters call themselves humanitarians and social justice warriors. It is now obvious that their ideology and their hatreds are what they are all about. And their labels for themselves are jokes of the highest order
An excellent essay. Information I didn’t have and questions I didn’t ask. What made the most impression on me is Hamas’ emphasis on documenting the horror they inflict to create fear and deterrence. For some reason I can't elucidate, my mind traveled through the centuries, some
1,500 years back. Sedition against Rome was punished with crucifixions. Thousands of Jews were subject to them, with the purpose of the horror being a
spectacle seen on the hill for days and days. “That’s what happens to those who defy
Rome”.
One day the empire became Christian,and crucifixions were outlawed.
Roughly around that time, not too long after, Islam was born, by the sword, administering as savage punishmemts
as it knew how, and for the same reason that animated Roman crucifixions.
Islam changed very little since then, and throughout the Middle East the savagery continues, whilst the world largely ignores it.
Instead, they project the blame on Israel. Hamas is not taken to task, and as the writer says, no one marches for the Gazan victims of Hamas, Muslims killing Muslims,as they do by the millions.
I wish, though, that we didn’t call the Gazans “Palestinians”. Palestine ceased to exist in 1947. In 1948, it became Egypt. In 2005, Israel gave it back to the Gazans, unilaterally. It was never called “ Palestine”. They could have, but didn’t. We shouldn’t help perpetrate the “ Palestinian” gigantic hoax.
Gazans chose Hamas and still do,for whatever reasons. The same animals who perpetrated 10/7 now butcher other Muslims.
So what else is new?
Earlier after 10/7 Israel was trying to support a militia against Hamas. It seems not to have crystallised into
a unified,effective force.
Let’s hope it will be.