Arguing that Israel must act 'proportionally' is plain wrong.
A better way to achieve peace, which is what the Geneva Conventions and United Nations were supposedly set up to do, is to focus not on “proportionality” but on deterrence.
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The principle of “proportionality” in warfare has all too often been floated in Israel’s direction since the October 7th Hamas-led massacres and kidnappings.
The most recent example was this week when U.S. President Joe Biden warned that Israel’s response should be “proportional” after Iran fired 181 ballistic missiles at the Jewish state.
“Proportionality” in modern warfare can be traced back to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the first formal international treaties that sought to limit the methods of warfare, prohibiting unnecessary suffering and the targeting of civilian populations. Naturally, many of the “rules” laid down at the Hague Conventions were violated in World War One just seven years later.
Then came the Geneva Conventions, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, which further codified the principle of “proportionality.” These treaties set out rules for the humane treatment of non-combatants and the conduct of hostilities, emphasizing that attacks must not cause excessive civilian harm in relation to the anticipated military advantage.
When people speak of “proportionality” today, they are mainly referring to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which has been ratified by 196 countries, including all UN member states.
But Israel’s immediate adversaries — namely Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis — are non-state actors. As such, wars against non-state actors (i.e. terrorist organizations) are inherently disproportionate because they are asymmetrical.
This means that, unlike traditional state-to-state warfare, where the adversary is a nation with clear borders, government, and military, Israel’s battles against non-state actors are more unpredictable and multifaceted. These groups often operate within densely populated civilian areas, use human shields, and are not bound by the same international laws and norms that apply to state actors.
One significant challenge Israel’s foes nefariously create is making it incredibly difficult for Israel to distinguish between combatants and civilians. The aforementioned terror groups habitually embed themselves within civilian populations — using actual people, homes, schools, mosques, and hospitals as shields.
This complicates Israel’s military operations, since efforts to neutralize threats can result in civilian casualties, leading to (unsubstantiated) international condemnation and (baseless) accusations of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and disproportionate use of force.
The challenge is exacerbated by the fact that these non-state actors do not adhere to traditional military uniforms or insignias — meaning, they purposely dress like civilians as “camouflage” — which also makes it increasingly difficult for Israel to identify and zero in on legitimate targets.
And yet, even as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah cowardly hole themselves up in urban areas as one of their primary “strategies,” Israel is said to have achieved an estimated one-to-one ratio of civilian-to-combatant casualties in this war, compared to the nine-to-one international average, according to the United Nations. In other words, nine civilian deaths for every one combatant death. And Israel is roughly at one-to-one.
However, now that Iran (a state actor) has directly entered itself into this war, one could argue that “proportionality” is suddenly relevant with regard to military actions between Israel and the Islamic Republic. After all, Iran became a signatory on the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1949 and ratified it eight years later, but the Iran of seven decades ago and the Iran of today are two vastly different entities.
Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a series of events that culminated in the overthrow of Iran’s Pahlavi dynasty and led to the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” the country has been run by Jihadist antisemites who have made the destruction of Israel a key pillar of their platform.
Even in Tuesday’s attack featuring those 181 ballistic missiles, Iran fired them knowing that they are inaccurate and would hit civilians if not for Israel’s impeccable missile defense system. If we are to measure “proportionality” by outcome and not intention, we are penalizing Israel for developing the world’s greatest defense systems and investing in infrastructure that protects virtually all of its citizens.
And still, Iran’s attack forced the entire Israeli population into shelters from 9:00 to 10:00 on Tuesday evening, not to mention damage to more than 100 homes in the Israeli city of Hod Hasharon, as well as to an apartment building in north Tel Aviv. And the lone casualty, ironically, was a Gazan who had been staying in a Palestinian security forces compound in the West Bank when he was killed by falling missile debris during the attack.
Had Israel not thwarted Iran’s indiscriminate attack, thousands of Israeli civilians would have been murdered and many more injured in what would immediately become a humanitarian crisis picture-perfect for headline world news. This is what Israel must take into account as it weighs a response to Iran, and this is what the world must acknowledge as it chirps on and on about “proportionality.”
A better way to achieve peace, which is what the Geneva Conventions and United Nations were supposedly set up to do, is to focus not on “proportionality” but on deterrence — predicated on the belief that a threat of overwhelming retaliation will dissuade adversaries from attacking.
However, for deterrence to be effective, it needs to be credible. Israel’s enemies must believe that any aggression will be met with a decisive response that outweighs any potential gains. Yet the constraints imposed by international leaders and the principle of “proportionality” weaken the credibility of Israel’s deterrence. As a result, Israel’s self-declared enemies are undeterred and the wars keep coming.
For instance, when Israel responds to rocket attacks or terrorist incursions with measured force, it risks being seen as weak, inviting further aggression. On the other hand, if Israel employs overwhelming force to decisively end the threat, it is accused of using disproportionate violence, leading to international condemnation and potential legal repercussions at the International Criminal Court. This tightrope walk between appearing strong and maintaining international legitimacy severely limits Israel’s strategic options.
Furthermore, the concept of “proportionality” is often interpreted in a vacuum, divorced from the broader context of Israel’s security situation. The cumulative effect of repeated attacks, the psychological toll on Israel’s civilians, and the long-term strategic implications of allowing adversaries to strike with relative impunity are rarely considered in the international community’s assessment of “proportionality.” As a result, Israel’s ability to deter future attacks is undermined, since its enemies are not sufficiently discouraged from continuing their aggression.
Hence why the subjective nature of “proportionality” often puts Israel in a no-win situation, especially when it is manipulated to mean that the defensive force has to be equal to the force used in the initial armed attack. That is not the proper definition of “proportionality.” Instead, “proportionality” means that you can use force that is proportionate to the defensive objective — to stop, to repel, and to prevent further attacks.
For example, Israel has described its war aims as the destruction of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. From a legal perspective, these war aims are consistent with “proportionality” in the laws of self-defense, given what Israel’s self-declared enemies say and do and what they have done and continue to do.
If we are being intellectually honest, “proportionality” is ultimately code speak for something else: Asking Israel, which is acting in self-defense, to agree to a ceasefire before its lawful defensive objectives have been met is, in effect, asking Israel to stop defending itself.
For such calls to be reasonable and credible, they must be accompanied by a realistic proposal setting out how Israel’s legitimate defensive goals against, say, Hamas and Hezbollah will be met through alternative means. It is not a legitimate answer to say that Israel has to take a diplomatic approach — because Hamas, Hezbollah, and even Iran are not interested in good-faith diplomacy.
“Proportionality” also applies in the law that governs the conduct of hostilities, not only in self-defense. The law of armed conflict requires that in every attack posing a risk to civilian life, that risk must not be excessive in relation to the military advantage that is anticipated. That rule does not mean, even when scrupulously observed, that civilians will be unharmed in armed conflict. The law of armed conflict, at its best, can mitigate the horrors of war but it cannot eliminate them.
The great challenge in this scenario is that Israel’s self-declared enemies are the kind of belligerent that cynically exploits these rules by putting civilians under its control at risk and even using them to seek immunity for its military operations, military equipment, and military personnel. An analysis of the application of the rules on “proportionality” in this conflict must always begin with such facts.
In this specific war, which is different than other wars (both past and present) and should not be compared to them as such, to argue for “proportionality” is to argue for more war — because “proportionality” essentially implies tit-for-tat.
Hezbollah and Israel are still fighting each other after 11 months of relentless efforts led by the U.S. and France to achieve a diplomatic resolution and end this conflict on the Israel-Lebanon border — precisely due to the imposition on Israel of this tit-for-tat “proportionality” and nothing more. In other words, after Hezbollah joined the Israel-Hamas war just one day after the Hamas-led massacres and kidnappings in Israel on October 7th, Israel essentially promised the U.S. and France that it would only respond proportionally to Hezbollah’s daily cross-border attacks.
During the last couple of weeks, Israel decided to “take the gloves off” after realizing that this tit-for-tat “proportionality” was stupidly ineffective. This has led to Hezbollah becoming increasingly curtailed and a new precedent being cemented, one that will hopefully lead to more peace and stability.
That is the key difference between “proportionality” and deterrence.
Another great essay. I hate pleas for "proportionality" because they're so intellectually dishonest, and to argue against this seemingly reasonable demand, you have to take the time, as you so eloquently have, to systematically expose its dishonesty. Which only works if anyone is listening.
My husband (who is not Jewish) joked recently that to ensure proportionality, Israel should fire exactly 181 ballistic missiles at military targets in Iran. He said that to really be proportional, we should aim for civilian targets but Israel is really interested in the military targets so that would do. Would that shut up the international call for proportionality? Of course not because our missiles would actually hit their targets.
Yesterday my rabbi's Rosh Hashanah sermon was about his discomfort with the ethical issues surrounding Jewish power. The subterfuge of the pager operation bothers him. He talked about the howls on the Internet about sneaky Jews. The wealthy Jews who threatened to pull their endowments unless colleges addressed their pro-Hamas ground forces bother him. He talked about the howls on the Internet about Jewish money. He is worried that if Jews use power, the world will hate them and things will get more dangerous for us.
And he also made the point that if Jews don't use their power, the world will simply wipe us out. He came to the ethical conclusion that there is no right answer.
He reminded me of Dara Horn's book, _People Love Dead Jews_, which Eylon Levy prefers to call, _People Love Jews Dead_. I remember the international calls for Jewish extermination on October 8, before Israel lifted a finger against Hamas. We looked weak then and excuse me, the world did not love us. A year later I hear all kinds of reports that they did, that for a whole week we had the world's sympathy. No we didn't. I was there. You were there. Everyone reading this was there. The world buzzed with people saying, "What can you expect, the Israelis deserved it."
When bad things happen specifically to Israelis and generally to Jews, the world either celebrates or makes an effort to politely hide its satisfaction.
When Jews look weak, the world moves in for the kill. When Jews look strong, the world howls in outrage.
Calls for "proportionality" are only polite requests to roll over and die. And you make that point.
I've really had it with the hypocrisy. Golda Meir nailed it: "If we have to have a choice between being dead and pitied, and being alive with a bad image, we'd rather be alive and have the bad image."
Who are you writing this for? Maybe you need to it to the Nantucket Ladies Auxiliary Gentile Club? The UN, Geneva Convention, and any other international organization are irrelevant when the stated objective is to finish the complete annihilation of every living Jew. There will not be another Holocaust. .