Why Iran Hates the Jewish State of Israel
The Islamic Republic of Iran's hostility towards Israel is rooted in a complex interplay of historical, ideological, political, financial, and regional factors.
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As my friend and longtime Israeli security official, Avi Melamed, likes to say: Most people think that in order to understand the Middle East, you have to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
But the reality is precisely the opposite: In order to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, you have to under the Middle East.
Historically, Iran (known as Persia until 1935) had relatively little direct conflict with the Jewish People or the region now known as the State of Israel. In fact, ancient Persia under Cyrus the Great is noted for allowing the Jews to return to their homeland from Babylonian captivity around 538 BCE.
In 1947, Iran was one of the 11 members that formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) charged to investigate the cause of the conflict in Palestine Mandate, and, if possible, devise a solution. After much deliberation the committee presented a Partition Plan for Palestine, which had support from eight of the 11 members of UNSCOP.
Iran along with India and Yugoslavia opposed the plan, predicting it would lead to an escalation of violence. Arguing that peace could only be established through a single federal state, Iran voted against the partition plan when it was adopted by the UN General Assembly.
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi predicted that the partition would lead to generations of fighting, yet Iran under the Shah maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Israel, recognizing its strategic value in a region dominated by Arab states.
After the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, Israel and Iran exhibited close ties. Iran was the second Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel as a sovereign state after Turkey. Israel viewed Iran as a natural ally and non-Arab power on the edge of the Arab world, in accordance with the concept of an alliance of the periphery of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion.
Israel had a permanent delegation in Tehran which served as a de facto embassy, before Ambassadors were exchanged in the late 1970s.
After the Six-Day War, Iran supplied Israel with a significant portion of its oil needs and Iranian oil was shipped to European markets via the joint Israeli-Iranian Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline. Trade between the countries was brisk, with Israeli construction firms and engineers active in Iran.
Furthermore, EL AL (the Israeli national airline) operated direct flights between Tel Aviv and Tehran, and Iranian-Israeli military links and projects — while kept secret — were rumored to be wide-ranging (for example, the joint military project Project Flower from 1977 to 1979, an Iranian-Israeli attempt to develop a new missile).
However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran marked a dramatic shift in the country’s foreign policy. The overthrow of the Shah and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic brought about a vehemently anti-Israel stance that has persisted for decades.
Ideological and Religious Factors
The ideological and religious foundation of Iran’s enmity towards Israel is deeply rooted in the principles of the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors have consistently framed Israel as a usurper state and an illegitimate entity occupying Muslim lands, specifically Jerusalem, which is promoted in the Arab and Muslim worlds as holding religious importance in Islam, even though the Temple Mount is really just another mosque.
Khomeini’s doctrine emphasized the struggle against what he termed “global arrogance,” primarily embodied by the United States and Israel. The regime has portrayed Israel as a pawn of Western imperialism, undermining the unity and sovereignty of the Muslim world. This narrative is ingrained in the Iranian revolutionary ethos, which views the liberation of Jerusalem and support for the Palestinian cause as central to its mission.
One has to wonder if Khomeini, like other politicians before him and still others to this day, invented an enemy to rally support for the Islamic Republic’s cause — a cause that has become increasingly unpopular amongst most everyday Iranians.
Shiite-Sunni dynamics also play a role. While Israel is predominantly concerned with its Arab Sunni neighbors, Iran, as a Shiite-majority state, uses its opposition to Israel to garner support and legitimacy among Sunni Muslims as well, positioning itself as a champion of Islamic unity against a common enemy.
Geopolitical and Strategic Ambitions
Geopolitically, Iran views Israel as a significant obstacle to its ambitions in the Middle East. Iran’s strategy — known as “regional hegemony” — revolves around expanding its influence across the region through a network of alliances and proxy forces, known as the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militias in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Territories.
Israel, conversely, perceives Iran as its primary regional threat due to Tehran’s support for anti-Israel militant groups and its military presence in neighboring countries. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities has further exacerbated tensions. Israel fears that a nuclear-armed Iran would embolden its proxies and alter the balance of power in the region, leading to heightened instability and conflict.
Moreover, Iran’s hostility towards Israel serves as a means to rally domestic support and deflect attention from internal issues. The regime uses anti-Israel rhetoric to unite various factions within the country, particularly during periods of economic hardship or political unrest.
Influence of External Powers
The rivalry between Iran and Israel is also influenced by their relationships with global powers, primarily the United States, Russia, and China. The U.S. has been a staunch ally of Israel since its founding, providing it with substantial military and economic aid. This alliance has cemented Israel’s security and regional superiority, much to Iran’s chagrin.
Iran, on the other hand, has sought to counterbalance U.S. and Israeli influence by forging ties with Russia and China. These relationships provide Iran with diplomatic support, economic investments, and military technology. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, for instance, has bolstered Iran’s position in the region, allowing it to maintain a strategic foothold near Israel’s borders.
Additionally, the U.S. policy of sanctions and containment against Iran, particularly over its nuclear program, has intensified Iranian animosity towards Israel, which is seen as a driving force behind American hostility.
Financial Considerations
Along with Qatar, the Iranians own the South Pars/North Dome natural-gas condensate field located in the Persian Gulf, by far the world’s largest natural gas field.
The South Pars Field was discovered in 1990 by National Iranian Oil Company, a government-owned national oil and natural gas producer and distributor under the direction of the Ministry of Petroleum of Iran. National Iranian Oil Company ranks as the world’s second-largest oil company, after Saudi Arabia’s state-owned Aramco.
More than 10 years ago, the Qataris tried to lobby Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to build a new gas pipeline from Qatar to the Mediterranean over Syrian territory and ultimately to Europe — but Assad proved unwilling, prompting the Qataris to fund anti-Assad rebel groups, which led to the Syrian civil war. (Some believe that Russia pressured Assad to reject the pipeline to safeguard its own business.)
Iran, which owns the other smaller share of the Persian Gulf gas field, decided to lodge its own rival plan for a $10-billion pipeline to Europe via Iraq and Syria, and then under the Mediterranean Sea. These plans apparently had Russia’s blessing, possibly because it could exert more influence over Iran. Assad signed off on the Iranians’ plan in 2012.
The Qataris are not the only ones who want to build an energy pipeline from the Middle East to Europe. As part of Saudi-Israeli normalization process that was gaining serious steam before Hamas’ October 7th onslaught, there had been talks of constructing energy pipelines from India and Saudi Arabia, through Israel, to Europe — called the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.
Thus, Hamas’ decision to invade, massacre, and kidnap on October 7th could very well be part of a bigger plan to disrupt Saudi-Israeli normalization and, thus, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Qatar, Iran, and Russia — all “friends” of Hamas — do not want to see the Saudis get any richer and gain more geopolitical power, especially if it means that they cannot share in the profits.
Hence, Iran is one of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s chief sponsors, so these terror groups can remain a thorn in Israel’s side not just because they agree ideologically, but also because Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad can hamper Israel from helping Iran’s regional financial competitors.
The Palestinian Issue
The Palestinian issue is central to Iran’s antagonism towards Israel. Iran has positioned itself as a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause, providing financial and military support to groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank. This support is framed not only as solidarity with fellow Muslims but also as a means to challenge Israeli “occupation” and “aggression.”
By championing the Palestinian cause, Iran aims to gain broader acceptance and leadership within the Muslim world, transcending sectarian divides. This stance also allows Iran to undermine Arab states that have normalized relations with Israel, portraying them as betrayers of the Palestinian struggle.
Interestingly, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party (which runs the Palestinian Authority) issued a statement rejecting Iranian involvement in Palestinian internal affairs just last month, in April, saying:
“This external interference, particularly by Iran, has no other objective than to sow chaos in the Palestinian internal arena. … We will not allow our sacred cause and the blood of our people to be exploited for suspicious plots that have nothing to do with them.”
Some have speculated that the Iranian regime is trying to topple Fatah’s rule in the Palestinian West Bank and replace it with Hamas, which rose to power of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and violently excommunicated Fatah from the enclave, including throwing political opponents off of buildings.
Unsurprisingly, Hamas and Fatah are bitter enemies but ultimately share a common “bigger” enemy — albeit an invented enemy — in Israel, which keeps the two Palestinian factions from engaging in an all-out civil war. Here is how Mosab Hassan Yousef, the son of one of Hamas’ founders, described it:
“There is no ‘Palestinians.’ There are tribes — the tribe of Hamas, the tribe of Islamic Jihad, the tribe of Khalil, the tribe of Nablus — and each one has different interests. And all of them are conflicted. If they did not have Israel as the common enemy, they would kill each other. This is the reality of what is so-called ‘Palestine.’”1
Speaking of common enemies, Israel and Saudi Arabia also share a deep-seated foe: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged in an ongoing, highly lethal struggle for dominant influence in the Middle East and other areas of the Muslim world.
In what has been described as a new cold war, the conflict is waged on multiple levels: geopolitical, economic, and sectarian to name a few. Iran believes it is the leading Shia Muslim power, while Saudi Arabia sees itself as that of Sunni Muslims. To add insult to injury, there are also historical tensions between Arabs and Persians among the two countries.
Prior to the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia fashioned itself as the leader of the Muslim world, basing its legitimacy in part on its control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. But in 1979, Saudi Arabia’s image as this de facto leader was undermined with the rise of Iran’s new theocratic government, which challenged the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s Al Saud dynasty and its authority as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.
Saudi King Khalid initially congratulated Iran and stated that “Islamic solidarity” could be the basis of closer relations between the two countries, but relations worsened substantially over the next decade. Since then, the two countries have been engaged in proxy wars across the Middle East, such as in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, and even amongst the Kurds.
On November 11th, 2023, the Saudis hosted an Arab-Islamic summit against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war. This included Iran, represented by its president, Ebrahim Raisi, marking the first visit to Saudi Arabia by an Iranian president in 11 years.
The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the summit was being held “in response to the exceptional circumstances taking place in the Palestinian Gaza Strip as countries feel the need to unify efforts and come out with a unified collective position.”
Yet when it came time to deliver a “unified collective position” at the summit’s end, there was not much unity at all. The proposal, presumably put forth by Iran or at least heavily endorsed by it, was to sever all diplomatic and economic relations with Israel, deny Arab airspace to Israeli flights, and for oil-producing Muslim countries to “threaten to use oil as a means of leverage” — all in order to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza.
Reportedly, the Saudis were among the countries that blocked this proposal. In another report at the end of October, one of the missiles fired towards Israel by Houthi rebels in Yemen was intercepted by — you guessed it — Saudi Arabia.
Then, in January, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, said on a panel at the vaunted World Economic Forum that the kingdom agreed “regional peace includes peace for Israel.” He said Saudi Arabia “certainly” would recognize Israel as part of a larger political agreement.
While it is nice to hear that the Saudis still want to normalize relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia might be doing so to send a message, loud and clear, to Iran: Your terror tentacles cannot disrupt the Middle East that we, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and others envision.
However, the Saudis are broadcasting a much different message nowadays than they were before October 7th. When Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sat down on September 20th for his first English-language television interview, he indicated that prospects for a deal to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel were on track.
While he added that “for us, the Palestinian issue is very important” and needed to be resolved, his comment on Israel reinforced a view that negotiations for the “deal of the century” were well underway.
Leaks to media outlets that outlined contours of the three-way talks related to defense, energy, and civilian nuclear power added to the sense that Saudi, Israeli, and American officials were persevering for a breakthrough that the Saudi Crown Prince asserted would be “the biggest historical deal since the end of the Cold War.”
Largely absent from the stream of material released into the public domain was any meaningful consideration of Palestinian interests, which at times appeared to be seen more as a concession in the tri-party efforts to reach an equilibrium, which would allow Saudi and Israeli officials to effectively “sell” any deal domestically and regionally.
Since October 7th, and increasingly in recent months, the Saudi emphasis on the Palestinians has noticeably changed: no normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia without a plan that will see the Palestinians get their own state.
“Because we need stability and only stability will come through the resolving the Palestinian issue,” said Prince Faisal bin Farhan.
What he was really saying is: Stability will only come by removing the Palestinians from Iran’s terrorizing grip. After all, the only way to continue to disrupt the stabilization of the Middle East and North Africa, if you are the Iranian regime, is to keep your proxies intact and emboldened, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, neither of which are interested in establishing a peaceful Palestinian state alongside the Jewish State of Israel.
A two-state solution of any sort only works if Iran-backed terrorism is eliminated, or at least defanged and pushed back to a comfortable distance.
Meanwhile, when you look at a map of these Iranian-backed countries and territories, they all surround Saudi Arabia and Israel. Therefore it seems beyond a reasonable doubt that Iran’s long-term strategy is to maintain a “noose” around the Saudis and Israelis, which the Iranians can tighten whenever they see fit.
Now, as the Middle East breaks out into mini wars between the Iranian “Axis of Resistance” and its adversaries, the last thing Iran wants is to appear weak in the eyes of Israel, the U.S. and its Arab allies, as well as domestic enemies of the Ayatollah’s regime.
Though it is bragging about hitting Israeli targets and Sunni terrorists in recent weeks, Iran’s response shows unquestionable shortcomings. Israel has allegedly continued to assassinate senior members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while the Iranians are striking fictitious Israeli targets far away from the Jewish state, such as “one of the main Mossad espionage headquarters” in Iraqi Kurdistan, an assertion that was promptly dismissed by Iraq.
This displays the limits of Iran’s power, and with nuclear-armed Pakistan hitting back inside Iranian territory, Tehran looks even less imposing.
However, the Iranian octopus has succeeded in one important avenue since October 7th: Tehran wants the U.S. and Europe to pressure Israel to prematurely curtail its war on Hamas, and is using the threat of regional escalation to achieve this aim.
As the U.S. repeatedly declares that it does not want to escalate against Iran, escalation and regional conflict are exactly what Iran is trying to deliver, largely through its proxies.
Tehran is betting that, if it can convince Washington and the European Union to stop supporting Israel because it risks igniting a broader blaze, Iran can force the U.S. and Europe to demand that Israel either ends its fight against Hamas and Hezbollah, or at least end American and European support for it.
Though there are also domestic reasons for growing pressure in the U.S. and across Europe to wind down Israel’s war against Hamas, anxieties that the U.S. and Europe could be drawn into a regional war have weighed heavily on American and European decision-makers.
Hence why it was not surprising that senior U.S. officials reportedly held indirect talks with Iran just two weeks ago in Oman, regarding the potential for escalation in the Middle East following last month’s hostilities between the Islamic Republic and Israel.
But if the U.S. and Europe finally decide to hold Iran accountable for exponentially destabilizing the Middle East, they will find plenty of willing partners. The responses to Iranian attacks demonstrate that a regional coalition can be quickly created to put the Islamic Republic in its place.
The Saudis want it, the Emiratis want it, the Bahrainis want it, the Jordanians want it, the Egyptians want it — and, of course, the Israelis want it.
“Dr. Phil Primetime.” Merit Street Media.
The question remains why does Biden continue to tiptoe around Iran? Yes, the US supported Israel in repelling the Iranian attack in April, but Biden prevented Israel from meaningful retaliation, has provided Irans billions of dollars in sanctions relief, failed to confront the proxy Houthis as they attacked maritime traffic, tacitly consented to Iran’s race to nuclear weapons, and, of course, has been a roadblock to an Israeli victory over Hamas, an Iranian proxy.
Thank you for some history and perspective. I just wish that everyone would be willing to learn facts rather than blindly assigning blame.