Israel’s response to Iran must be smart, not right.
A few years ago, I learned that the approach of being “smart, not right” usually yields the best results. Israel would be wise to act accordingly as it mulls a response to last night's Iranian attack.
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The Islamic Republic of Iran launched some 185 drones, 110 surface-to-surface missiles, and 36 cruise missiles at Israel on Saturday night.
Though most were launched from Iranian soil, some also came from Iraq, Yemen, and Syria.
Sirens began sounding in southern Israeli communities around 1:42 a.m., before extending to large swathes of the country. Loud booms sounded across north and south, as well as in Jerusalem and many towns in the northern West Bank.
According to an analysis from the Institute for the Study of War, the Iranian strike resembled Russian attacks on Ukraine.1
“Russian strikes have attempted to determine the optimal package to penetrate Western air and missile defenses,” the Institute wrote. “Russia has experimented with combinations of ballistic and cruise missiles alongside Iranian drones in Ukraine.”
Iran also has tested U.S. Navy air defenses through Houthi drone attacks, according to the study.
Meanwhile, the IDF said that it intercepted “the vast majority” of the dozens of Iranian ballistic missiles that were fired at Israel. The missiles were downed by the Arrow air defense system before they managed to enter Israeli airspace, and many dozens of drones and cruise missiles launched from Iran were also shot down by fighter jets.
“A few impacts were identified, among them at a military base in the south of the country, with minor damage to infrastructure,” the IDF statement said.
Knee-jerk rationale says that Israel ought to respond to Iran with significant force. It should pound the Iranian regime and its assets, such as its oil fields, in an imposing act of deterrence.
Indeed, images coming out of Iran last night showed incredibly long lines of Iranian civilians in their cars at gas stations, an indication that many Iranians presume Israel could retaliate by attacking parts of Iran’s oil infrastructure.
Let’s recall that this Iranian attack — the first-ever on the State of Israel — was in response to the IDF apparently carrying out an airstrike, on April 1st, on an “Iranian consulate building” in the Syrian capital of Damascus, which killed several Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, including two generals (one of whom was considered an “architect” of the Hamas-led massacres in Israel on October 7th).2
Israel did not officially take responsibility for the strike, but IDF Spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari has pointed to Israeli intelligence proving the building was not an embassy, but rather “a military building of Quds forces disguised as a civilian building in Damascus.” The Quds Force is the foreign operations arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is classified as a terror organization by the U.S.
Iran’s response took two weeks, which tells us that it was not a knee-jerk reaction, but a calculated, forecasted, and strategic series of decisions. The Iranians knew that the combination of drones, missiles, and cruise missiles would at best cause the most minor of damage to Israeli targets.
According to one report, a large Iranian suicide drone on its way to Israel, crashed in Shiraz (a major city in Iran) and caused more damage than what the Iranians managed with all their drones and missiles launched at Israel.3
Still, the Iranians knew that they had to respond directly to the killings of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders in Syria, as opposed to relying on their proxies to do so, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In fact, it was a strategic decision to not involve Hezbollah in their response, since Israel would then consider an attack on Hezbollah in its response, which Iran wants to avoid. Why? Because the Iranians know that Israel has significantly impacted Hezbollah’s capabilities on the Lebanese border with Israel since Hezbollah joined the Palestinians’ fray after the Hamas-led October 7th terror attacks.
The Iranian attack was also a test, according to author Israel Bitton, who added that Iran wanted to learn a few lessons, including that:
Iran can, without any immediate consequence, shut down the airspace of nearly the entire Middle East.
Iran can paralyze Israel as the entire country is forced to wait in/near shelters and brace themselves for an unknown onslaught.
With Israel on high alert, and the attack telegraphed to the world days in advance, Iran managed to do the above but not really penetrate Israel’s defensive umbrella.
”It was a military operation to both save face and back up their belligerent tone in the aftermath of Israel’s elimination of a top IRGC general, and to test how many drones and missiles it will take to overwhelm Israel’s and its allies’ defenses,” wrote Bitton.4
“What this means is that those folks like U.S. President Joe Biden parading the idea that Israel ought to ‘pocket the win’ for having successfully defended itself against a major (but relatively minor) onslaught are simply telling Israel to set the stage for the next round which will be inevitably worse and exact a significant human toll.”
“Because if Iran was brazen enough to attack Israel with pathetic slow-flying drones waiting to be shot out of the sky although they possess a massive arsenal of far more sophisticated missiles,” added Bitton, “why the hell would anyone assume, let alone promote, the notion that this is as far as Iran will go and therefore Iran should be let off the hook with no consequence? Israel knows this. America does too.”
Thus, Israel’s response to the Iranian attack yesterday must also be calculated, forecasted, and strategic. As one social media user commented:
“Announce that the only measure that will prevent a counterattack is for all hostages to be freed within 72 hours.”5
More realistically, an Israeli response must take into account the bigger Middle Eastern geopolitical picture and the long-term view beyond the current Israel-Iranian proxy war. Most importantly, it must take into account its current allies in the region (the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain) and future ones, most notably the Saudis (who for all intents and purposes are unofficially current Israeli allies).
For Israel, no less for the region, a wider war should not be sought right now because it would distract the Israelis from ridding Gaza of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s wrath. The Jewish state’s chief responsibility for the foreseeable future ought to be minimizing the threats on its borders, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Palestinian terror cells in the West Bank, and Hezbollah on the Israel-Lebanon border.
Once these three threats are neutralized and a proper deterrence plan is in place, Israel should then work with its regional partners on crafting a vision for the Middle East that everyone at the table supports, endorses, and contributes to — including how to deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and what a regional war against it and its proxies could entail.
We all know that Iran (as well as Qatar) is the chief destabilizing force in the region. As such, countering the Iranian regime will take a collaborative, multidisciplinary approach. Israel can defend itself against hostile countries and terror groups on its borders, but it cannot alone effectively police the Middle East.
The only real way to deal with Iran is as a collective. After all, Jordan was one of the countries that helped Israel shoot down missiles from the Iranian attack last night.
As it relates to the immediate Iranian “threat,” Israel should not lose focus on the actual threats — Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Palestinian terror cells in the West Bank.
Everything else is a distraction, at least for now.
“IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 13, 2024.” Institute for the Study of War.
“Iranian General Killed In Israeli Strike Was Architect Of October 7.” Iran International.
Marc Zell on X
Israel B. Bitton on X
Kamel Amin Thaabet on X
Very insightful, Josh. Sure, why should Israel spend her resources attacking Iran if, after, this test attack (as you put it), proves relatively minor, Iran poses no immediate threat? Yes, Israel must finish the goal of eliminating Hamas, securing Gaza and Judea/Samaria and defeating Hezbollah. That is enough for Israel to deal with.
I agree that this is a time for strategic reaction. The world has watched as the attack on Israel lumbered on, knowing full well that Iran is capable of inflicting much worse destruction. Why was this done? To show force, save face, yet not to inflict the most destruction possible. Thank God for this and let's move forward. Get the hostages home.