The Deceiving Trap of Israel's So-Called 'Right to Defend Itself'

Defense and deterrence are not one in the same. If Israel is to survive long-term, it must restore its all-important doctrine of uninhibited deterrence, no holds barred.

Israeli soldiers in Gaza (photo: IDF/X)

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Israel’s military strength and technological prowess are often touted as the linchpins of its security, enabling the Jewish state to defend itself against a variety of threats.

This narrative is often coupled with the overly repetitive notion that “Israel has the right to defend itself” — an ambiguous sentiment that many Western politicians publicly promote about Israel, knowing that it is both misleading and strategically limiting.

As a matter of fact, this paradigm traps Israel in a reactive cycle, significantly curtailing the Jewish state’s ability to strike preemptively and thereby eroding its deterrence capability, while grossly endangering the country both within and outside of its borders.

In theory as well as application, preemptive strikes are intended to disrupt an adversary’s plans and maintain a country’s strategic edge. This is why preemptive strikes historically have been a key component of Israel’s security doctrine. Given its tiny geographic size and the existential threats it faces from neighboring states and non-state actors, Israel has routinely emphasized the need to act before a threat fully materializes.

The Six-Day War in 1967 is often cited as a successful example, where Israel’s preemptive attack on Egyptian airfields crippled the Arab coalition’s ability to wage war.

Levi Eshkol was Israel’s prime minister in May 1967, when the Egyptians ousted United Nations peacekeepers from Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, remilitarized them both, and closed the Straits of Tiran to shipping to and from Israel’s southernmost city of Eilat.

Joining Egypt in preparing to destroy Israel were the armies of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Israel was surrounded and shorn of allies; France, its sole superpower backer at the time, hastily switched sides. The Arabs, unlike Israel, had oil.

When asked by Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban on May 26th whether the United States would back a preemptive strike against its assembled enemies, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson repeatedly replied, “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone.”

In other words, the decision was in the hands of Eshkol.

“A wry, gray, avuncular leader — hardly the warrior type — Eshkol had to weigh the risks of not striking first versus the danger of forfeiting American support,” wrote Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States. “By waiting for the Arab armies to attack, Israel’s very existence might be endangered. Egyptian tanks could be rumbling through Tel Aviv and the Jordanian flag flying over Jerusalem. On the other hand, if Israel struck first and failed, the country would be left utterly defenseless. No nation, not even the United States, would come to Israel’s aid.”¹

For the three weeks still remembered by Israelis of that generation in Hebrew as T’kufat HaHamtanah — the waiting period of unbearable tension — Eshkol exhausted one diplomatic option after another. Then, finally, he decided to act.

On the morning of June 6th, Israeli warplanes bombed hundreds of Egyptian fighter jets on the ground. The air forces of Jordan and Syria were incinerated next. Israeli ground troops soon charged into Sinai, Gaza, Jerusalem, and the West Bank — conquering them all. Syria’s Golan Heights fell as well.

Six days later, Israel had almost quadrupled the territory under its control — including, for the first time since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE, the Old City of Jerusalem.

The Jewish world rejoiced. But what would President Johnson say? Would he punish Israel for its insolence — perhaps even sever ties?

“Johnson did nothing of the sort,” wrote Michael Oren. “On the contrary, he admired Israel’s determination to stick up for itself. For the first time, an American president approved the sale of tanks and advanced jets to Israel and stood firmly beside it in the United Nations Security Council. Out of Eshkol’s gumption, the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance was born.”

However, the strategic environment of the 21st century is vastly different from that of the 1960s.

Today Israel faces a range of non-state actors, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (all of which are chiefly funded by Iran). These terror groups purposely operate within densely populated civilian areas, use asymmetric tactics like human shields, and are often covered by the broader international community’s reluctance to endorse military actions that could lead to civilian casualties (even though it is Hamas and Hezbollah which purposefully generate more civilian casualties on all sides).

Consequently, Israel’s ability to launch effective preemptive strikes is severely constrained. Any military action is likely to provoke international condemnation, inflame regional tensions, and result in retaliatory attacks, undermining the very security Israel seeks to enhance.

A significant factor in the erosion of Israel’s deterrence capability is the international double standard that often governs the response to its military actions. While Israel upholds high moral standards in its conduct of war — avoiding civilian casualties and adhering to international law — its adversaries are often held to a different, less stringent standard. This asymmetry creates a moral quandary for Israel: the more it strives to minimize collateral damage and operate within the confines of international law, the more its enemies exploit these constraints.

For instance, groups like Hamas and Hezbollah deliberately embed their military infrastructure within civilian populations, knowing that any Israeli attempt to target these assets will likely result in civilian casualties and subsequent international backlash. This tactic not only shields them from effective military strikes but also turns global public opinion against Israel, regardless of the legitimacy of its defensive actions.

This erosion of deterrence is also evident in the behavior of Israel’s adversaries. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have increasingly tested Israel’s red lines, launching rocket attacks and conducting cross-border incursions with the expectation that Israel will respond defensively rather than preemptively. This creates a cycle of provocation and retaliation that undermines Israel’s long-term security.

The problem is compounded by the fact that Israel’s enemies often use the time gained from Israel’s hesitation to strengthen their military capabilities. For example, Hezbollah has used periods of relative calm to amass an arsenal of over 100,000 rockets and missiles, many of which are capable of reaching deep into Israeli territory. Similarly, Hamas has used ceasefires to rebuild its tunnel networks and develop more sophisticated weapons. By the time Israel is forced to respond, the threat has often grown to the point where a full-scale conflict is necessary to neutralize it.

Moreover, Israel’s adherence to international norms, while morally commendable, inadvertently weakens its deterrence. Adversaries are emboldened by the knowledge that Israel is unlikely to engage in the kind of total warfare that would be necessary to fully eliminate the threat they pose. This restraint, driven by both ethical considerations and international pressure, leaves Israel in a perpetual state of reacting to aggression rather than preventing it.

The principle of proportionality in warfare further complicates Israel’s ability to deter threats effectively. Under international law, military actions must be proportional to the threat faced, meaning that the force used should not exceed what is necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective. However, the subjective nature of this principle often places Israel in a lose-lose situation.

When Israel responds to rocket attacks or terrorist incursions with measured force, it risks being seen as weak, inviting further aggression. On the other hand, if Israel employs overwhelming force to decisively end the threat, it is accused of using disproportionate violence, leading to international condemnation and potential legal repercussions at the International Criminal Court. This tightrope walk between appearing strong and maintaining international legitimacy severely limits Israel’s strategic options.

Furthermore, the concept of proportionality is often interpreted in a vacuum, divorced from the broader context of Israel’s security situation. The cumulative effect of repeated attacks, the psychological toll on the civilian population, and the long-term strategic implications of allowing adversaries to strike with impunity are rarely considered in the international community’s assessment of proportionality. As a result, Israel’s ability to deter future attacks is undermined, since its enemies are not sufficiently discouraged from continuing their aggression.

Deterrence is predicated on the belief that the threat of overwhelming retaliation will dissuade adversaries from attacking. However, for deterrence to be effective, it must be credible. Israel’s enemies must believe that any aggression will be met with a decisive response that outweighs any potential gains. Yet the constraints imposed by international norms, the principle of proportionality, and the need to avoid civilian casualties weaken the credibility of Israel’s deterrence.

What’s more, the evolving nature of Israel’s adversaries complicates the deterrence calculus. Non-state actors like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operate under different strategic and ideological imperatives than traditional state actors. They are less concerned with the immediate consequences of Israeli retaliation and more focused on the long-term struggle against Israel, often branding their actions as part of a broader resistance narrative. For them, survival in and of itself is an extraordinary victory.

This ideological commitment, coupled with the ability to replenish their ranks and resources through external support — such as state sponsors of terrorism like Iran and Qatar, as well as quasi-“humanitarian” nonprofits that raise money on the false pretenses of, say, “women and children in Gaza” — means that deterrence alone is insufficient to neutralize the threat they pose.

In addition, the interconnectedness of the global media and the rise of social media have fundamentally altered the dynamics of deterrence. Israel’s military actions are scrutinized in real-time, with every strike and counterstrike instantly broadcast to a global audience.

This transparency erodes the element of surprise, a key component of traditional deterrence, and allows adversaries to shape the narrative in their favor, portraying themselves as victims of Israeli aggression regardless of the facts on the ground.

As a result of these factors, Israel is caught in a reactive cycle that perpetuates its security challenges. Unable to fully eliminate the threats posed by its adversaries due to the constraints discussed, Israel is forced to respond to each new attack, often with limited effectiveness.

This reactionary posture not only drains Israel’s resources and diminishes its standing in the international community but also emboldens its enemies, who perceive Israel’s responses as evidence of its inability to impose lasting consequences for aggression.

This cycle is further reinforced by the broader geopolitical context in which Israel operates. Regional powers like Iran continue to support and arm groups hostile to Israel, while the international community’s focus on diplomacy and conflict resolution (two terms that are tend to be irrelevant in the wild, wild Middle East) often sidelines Israel’s security concerns.

Such an environment allows adversaries to regroup and rearm between conflicts, ensuring that Israel remains perpetually on the defensive. This is precisely what Western politicians mean when they say: “Israel has the right to defend itself.” Without an ongoing green light to take preemptive actions, Israel cannot put its self-professed enemies on the defensive and neutralize existential dangers.

There are times when Israel has acted preemptively, such as just a week ago when the IDF launched a major strike in which it used some 100 aircrafts to take out thousands of Hezbollah rocket launchers in Lebanon, including some believed to be aimed at the Mossad headquarters in central Israel.

Hezbollah still managed to launch more than 200 rockets and drones from Lebanon at northern and central Israel, but the real headline was this: By preemptively taking the fight to Hezbollah on that Sunday morning, Israel likely prevented a far more devastating Hezbollah attack and thus an all-out war.

The same cannot entirely be said about Israel’s response to the Hamas-led October 7th massacres. Back in February and March, the terrorist organization used contacts, likely via Qatar, to spread stories about how it needed Israel to pause fighting over Ramadan. Then in March and April, it sought to prevent an operation in Rafah by claiming civilians could not evacuate Gaza’s southernmost city on the border with Egypt (which Hamas manipulates to smuggle in weapons and other resources).

The IDF began the operation in Rafah in early May, having left Khan Younis in April. This enabled Hamas to shift its forces from Rafah to Khan Younis. Hamas basically already played for time to prevent a Rafah operation, gaining some six months in this respect.²

The toll that all this takes on Israeli society is monumental. Many Israelis are sick and tired of living in a warzone that could very well be avoided if Israel was allowed to restore its all-important doctrine of uninhibited deterrence. As it stands, Israelis are growing tired of their country having to wait for enemies to take the fight to Israel, and then Israel being forced to fight with two hands behind its back.

Hence why many Israelis are deciding to leave the country, creating debilitating brain-drain. According to recent data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of Israelis who permanently left the country spiked after the Hamas-led massacres on October 7th. More than 20-percent fewer Israelis have returned from living abroad as well, all compared to the previous year.³

Long story short, defense and deterrence are not one in the same. If Israel is to survive in perpetuity, the Jewish state must restore its all-important doctrine of uninhibited deterrence. Hopefully the international community understands this, but if not, Israel might have to go at it alone.

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1. “Should Israel Strike First?” Clarity With Michael Oren.

2. “Hamas is demanding the Philadelphi corridor for a reason - analysis.” The Jerusalem Post.

3. “Nobel and Israel Prize laureate: ‘We won’t have a state’ if brain drain continues.” The Times of Israel.